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THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE INEVITABILITY
OF PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
Robert J Pushaw, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
What is the judiciary's proper role in reviewing claims that the
federal government, in attempting to protect national security, has
violated individual rights? This perennial constitutional question has
arisen with renewed urgency since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
A week after that tragedy, Congress authorized the President to
use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those who planned,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks and to prevent similar future
assaults.1 George Bush invoked this statute, as well as his broad Article
II power as Commander in Chief, to wage war against al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and to (1) indefinitely jail anyone whom he alone
deemed an "enemy combatant" (i.e., part of forces engaged in armed
conflict with the United States), and (2) try such prisoners by military
commissions of his creation. 2
The Supreme Court has invalidated both of these policies. In
three cases handed down in 2004, a majority of Justices held that
alleged "enemy combatants" (both citizens and aliens) could invoke
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to vindicate their due process right
to an impartial hearing concerning the lawfulness of their deten-
© 2007 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D.,
Yale, 1988. Thanks to Tracey George, Barry McDonald, Grant Nelson, and Jim
Pfander for their very helpful comments.
1 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. II 2003)).
2 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in
10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
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tions.3 The Court declined to decide, however, 
whether a military
commission would be sufficiently impartial.
4 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5
the Court ruled that Congress had not authorized 
President Bush to
establish such commissions at the United States 
Naval Base in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.6 All of these cases featured 
vigorous dissents, with
Justice Thomas taking the lead in arguing 
that the judiciary had
ignored both precedent and national security 
by interfering with the
President's discretionary exercise of 
his Article II power.
7
Most legal scholars, who have persistently 
assailed the Bush
Administration's treatment of enemy detainees," 
praised the Justices
for their courage in upholding cherished individual 
liberties and the
rule of law.9 Indeed, some commentators have 
discerned a larger his-
3 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality 
opinion); Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004). These cases are dis-
cussed in Part III.A.
4 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
5 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6 Id. at 2772-98.
7 Only Justice Thomas dissented in Hamdi. 
542 U.S. at 579-99. He and Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's dissent in Rasul, 
542 U.S. at 488-506. In
Hamdan, Justice Thomas and two colleagues 
filed separate dissents. See Hamdan, 126
S. Ct. at 2810-23 (Scalia,J., dissenting); id. at 2823-49 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
2849-55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
8 See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
261, 273 (2002) (citing the
condemnation of military commissions by 
prominent law professors such as Bruce
Ackerman, George Fletcher, Harold Koh, 
Judith Resnik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter).
Professor Cole has been the leading academic 
critic. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERROR-
ISM (2003); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial 
Review and Individual Rights
in Times of Crisis, 101 MIcH. L. REv. 2565 (2003) [hereinafter 
Cole, Judging]; David
Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History 
in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (2003); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The 
Emergency Constitution's Blind
Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (2004) [hereinafter Cole, Morality]. 
Other important works
include Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, 
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Jules Lobel, 
The War on Terrorism and
Civil Liberties, 63 U. PiTr. L. REv. 767 (2002);JordanJ. 
Paust, Post 9/11 Overreaction and
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status 
of Persons, Judicial Review of
Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335 (2004).
For a contrary view, see Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian 
Panics, 36 RUTGERS LJ. 871, 872,
881, 886-87 (2005) (decrying the response of intellectual 
elites to post-September 11
measures as often "ignorant," "irrational," 
"hysterical," and reflective of an extreme
libertarian bias that, if implemented, would 
result in legal and institutional mecha-
nisms that would under-protect national security).
9 For example, Professor Cole characterized 
Hamdan as
equal parts stunning and crucial. Stunning 
because the Court, unlike Con-
gress, the opposition party or the American 
people, actually stood up to the
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torical movement in which the modern Court has become increas-
ingly willing to rein in the government's assertion of war powers,",
Ideally, they would favor the execise of ordinary "judicial review"-
i.e., independently interpreting and applying the Constitution,
regardless of the competing views of Congress or the President."
President. Crucial because the Court's decision ... marked... a dramatic
refutation of the administration's entire approach to the "war on terror."..
iTihe Hamdan case stands for the proposition that the rule of law .. is not
subservient to the will of the executive, even during wartime.
David Cole, One Nation Under Law-Not Bush, SALON.COM, July 25, 2006,
http://rww.salon.com/apinion/feature/2006/O7/25/hamdan/index.htmL Similarly, Har-
old Koh deemed Hamdan "a stunning rebuke to the extreme theory of executive
power that has been put forward for the last five years." See Charlie Savage, Justices
Deal Bush Setback on Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2006, at Al (citing Koh); see
also Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law,
and Comparative Executive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REv.
51, 51 ("Rarely has the Supreme Court handed a 'wartime' president a greater defeat,
or human rights defenders a greater victory."); id. at 82 (describing Hamdan as "an
act of courage"). Hamdan's lead attorney, Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal,
applauded this "rare Supreme Court rebuke to the President during armed conflict,"
Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rurnsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Prac-
tice, 120 HARV. L. REv. 65, 66 (2006); see also id. at 69-70, 92, 97-116 (contending that
the Court correctly rejected the Bush Administration's "radical" and "dangerous" the-
ory that the judiciary should show extreme deference to the President's assertion of
"inherent authority" to ignore or creatively interpret statutes and treaties governing
military afflairs).
The Hamdi trio of cases has elicited similar praise, See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Watching
the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment's Shadow, LAw & CoNTruMP. PROBS.,
Spring 2005, at 255, 264 (noting that many "[c livil libertarians and progressives...
applauded" these decisions); Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 555, 564-72 (2005) (citing Hamdi and Rasul as illus-
trating that the Court sometimes acts courageously in limiting military programs to
defend constitutional values); Jordan J. Paust, International Law Before the Supreme
Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. Rxv. 829, 830-41 (2005).
10 See Cole, Morality, supra note 8, at 1761-63 (making this claim, but acknowl-
edging cases in which the Court failed to check government abuses in wartime); see
also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 221 (First Vintage Books ed.,
Vintage Books 2000) (1998) (discerning a positive overall trend toward protecting
individual rights despite certain decisions to the contrary); Goldsmith & Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 262, 285 (maintaining that Americans' regret over unnecessary or
excessive curtailment of individual rights in prior wars "produces a ratchet effect, over
time, in favor of more expansive civil liberties during wartime"); Harold Hongju Koh,
The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 39 (2002) (urging Americans to obey, not
ignore, the elaborate laws that have been developed over the years to deal with secur-
ity crises such as the al Qaeda attacks).
11 These critics argue that the Constitution originally contemplated that federal
judges would ensure that a President's military action had been taken pursuant to
Congress's declaration of war (or equivalent authorization) and had not violated indi-
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By contrast, a few legal academics, most notably John Yoo, have
maintained that the Constitution (1) entrusts all military powers to
the political branches; (2) establishes a unitary executive uniquely
capable of taking swift action based on the expert advice of officials
who possess confidential information; and (3) sharply limits judicial
review of wartime decisions.12 These scholars have defended the Bush
vidual legal rights. They lament that both the Court and Congress have often shirked
their constitutional duties to check the executive, resulting in a systematic and perma-
nent reduction in civil liberties. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY
5-11 (1993); Louis FISHER, CONGRESSiONAtL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 3-14
(2000); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6-16 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER]; THOMAS M. FR'CK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JuoI-
CiAL ANswEms 3-9 (1992); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 80-95
(1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECuRiTY CONSTITUTION 74-77, 158-61
(1990); Lobel, supra note 8, at 767-90; Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Con-
stitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 677-88 (1972); Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 649, 675-86 (2002);
William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 695, 700, 740-56 (1997).
Two scholars have urged federal courts to apply ordinary administrative law stan-
dards, which feature deferential yet meaningful judicial review of the decisions of
expert agencies. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative
Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005); Christina E. Wells, Questioning
Deference, 69 Mo. L. REv. 903 (2004). Under this approach,judges would take a "hard
look" at the President's factual and legal determinations to ensure that he has pro-
vided a rational justification, based on substantial evidence, for a particular military
action. See Masur, supra, at 443-56, 482-501, 519-21; Wells, supra, at 944-48.
Such proposals raise several problems. First, standards of judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (2000)), for executive actions taken pursuant to garden-variety regulatory
statutes are not obviously relevant to presidential decisions about war made under a
Constitution that predates the administrative state by a century-and-a-half. Second,
agencies act on a publicly available record, whereas the President and his subordi-
nates make military decisions based upon information that is often confidential;
therefore, a court order compelling disclosure of these facts raises serious separation-
of-powers concerns. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638, 705-06 (1974). Finally,
it seems unrealistic to expectjudges to hold that the President's proffered reasons for
a military decision were irrational and unsupported-or for the President to obey
such a judgment when he has concluded that America's security is at risk. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 Mo. L.
REv. 959, 968-70 (2004).
12 SeeJohn C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Under-
standing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation];
John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Yoo, War]; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs:
An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 527 (1999) (contending that the
Constitution grants the executive primary, but not exclusive or unlimited, power to
conduct foreign policy and preserve national security).
1008 [VOL. 82:3
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Administration's War on Terrorism' 3 and condemned the "enemy
combatant" cases as unprecedented intrusions into the executive's
domain.14
Each side in this debate makes a valuable contribution, but
neither fully captures the complexity of judicial review in this area.
The Bush critics correctly stress that only autonomous Article III
judges can ensure that Congress and the President stay within legal
bounds and can protect individual rights in times of crisis, and they
cite several cases in which the Court has done so.15 These scholars
cannot, however, persuasively tell us why military decisions have always
been accorded a far more deferential standard of judicial review than
purely domestic ones, with the result that the government's policies
usually pass muster--even seemingly blatant constitutional violations
such as Franklin Roosevelt's mass imprisonment of Japanese-Ameri-
cans during World War 11.16 Moreover, some civil libertarians have
engaged in wishful thinking by suggesting that the modern Court has
Similarly, Professors Posner and Vermeule have commended federal judges for
showing extra deference during times of crisis. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Verrneule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. Rev. 605 (2003). In their view, the
Court has rationally concluded that the benefits of passivity-enabling the politically
accountable executive to act quickly and decisively based upon superior military
expertise and access to information-outweigh the costs of potential government
abuse or curtailment of civil liberties. See id. at 606-11, 639-44; see also Earl M. Maltz,
The Exigencies of War, 36 RUTGxRS LJ. 861, 869-70 (2005) (claiming that courts must
be extremely deferential to government actions taken during a total war or insurrec-
tion, because judicial intervention to uphold individual rights poses intractable practi-
cal problems and might result in a disaster).
13 They assert that terrorists are not ordinary criminals entitled to regular judicial
processes but rather nonuniformed enemy warriors to be dealt with by the President
according to the law of war, which allows both detention for the duration of the
armed conflict and trials by military tribunals. See Derek Jinks, September 11 and the
Laws of War, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 10-20 (2003);John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The
Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 215-28 (2003).
14 See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO
Sup. CT. REv. 83 (maintaining that the Court in Hamdan, as in Hamdi and Rasul,
ignored centuries of constitutional practice and precedent by interfering with the
President's Article II power to make military policyjudgments and forced the political
branches to expend resources that would be better spent fighting terrorists).
15 See, e.g., Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2566-67, 2572-73.
16 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the exec-
utive branch's judgment that the war againstJapan required the forcible relocation of
Japanese-Americans to prevent espionage and sabotage, despite infringements on
their due process and equal protection rights). Libertarians might respond that such
cases were wrongly decided by weak Courts, but this argument does not explain the
frequency of such "bad" decisions throughout history and their support by Justices of
varying political and ideological stripes.
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been progressing in the direction of ever-expanding protection of
individual rights against assertions of war powers.17
At the other end of the spectrum, President Bush's defenders
accurately highlight the dominant constitutional role of the political
branches (especially the executive) in military affairs and the corre-
spondingly restricted nature of judicial review."' Nonetheless, they
have trouble accounting for several cases in which the Court has
struck down war measures.1 9
17 An exhaustive recent study of cases over the past sixty years demonstrates that
the Court consistently sacrifices constitutional rights and liberties during emergen-
cies. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2005). This phenomenon dates back to the earliest days of
the Republic. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
(2004) (urging that, to avoid repeating mistakes such as the Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798 and the targeting of Communists in the 1950s, America must develop a cul-
ture of civil liberties-implemented through government mechanisms and legal doc-
trines-to deal with the inevitable stresses of wartime, especially the tendency to
suppress dissent). For similar themes, see, for example, MARTIN S. SHEFFER, THEJUDI-
CIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (1999); MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM
UNDER FIRE (1990).
Professors Posner and Vermeule have dismissed, as empirically unsustainable, the
notion of a "libertarian ratchet" (i.e., that wars have ended up producing ever-greater
respect for civil liberties). See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 622-25. They
also reject the opposite claim that increased executive powers granted during an
emergency always become permanent, thereby irreversibly diminishing individual
rights. Id. at 609-21. Rather, they conclude that there are no uni-directional trends:
The government balances security and liberty interests in a complex policy calculus
depending on the circumstances. Id. at 625-26.
18 See infra Part I (summarizing the constitutional framework).
19 Professor Yoo has argued that federal courts have appropriately adopted a
unique approach to cases involving military affairs. John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and
the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427 (2003). On the one hand, the initia-
tion of war abroad has been deemed a political question because the Constitution
vests military powers exclusively in the political branches and does not specify a single
required process for commencing war. Id. at 428-31, 433-36, 451. On the other
hand, federal judges have examined the domestic ramifications of war-especially
cases concerning American citizens as enemies or operations within the United
States-but under a deferential standard that preserves options to the elected
branches. Id. at 428-29, 440, 450-51.
Professor Yoo helpfully categorizes most Supreme Court decisions. For example,
he is correct thatjudicial review has never been exercised over disputes arising out of
the initiation of hostilities. See infra notes 58-63, 69-77, 83, 185-88 and accompany-
ing text. Nonetheless, his suggestion that the Court adjudicates issues dealing with
the domestic implications of war does not explain several critical decisions. For
instance, the Court sometimes has refused to review executive judgments concerning
military operations within the United States involving American citizens, most notably
Lincoln's blockade of Confederate ports and his use of military commissions. See infra
notes 86, 90, 100-06, 110-14 and accompanying text. Conversely, in certain situa-
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Some commentators have rejected the extremes of "libertarian
idealism" and "executive domination" and contended 
that the Court
has properly applied a more balanced approach. 
For instance, Sam
Issacharoff and Rick Pildes argue that the judiciary historically 
has
played an important role during wartime; 
albeit not by making sub-
stantive judgments about constitutional rights or by assessing 
the sig-
nificance of the President's national security 
claims.20 Rather, the
Court has preserved the institutional 
framework and processes
through which decisionmaking on these 
issues occurs, primarily by
deferring to executive conduct only if it 
has been endorsed by Con-
gress. 21 Similarly, Cass Sunstein maintains 
that the Justices have
appropriately employed a "minimalist" approach 
with several features,
most crucially the requirement of clear 
legislative authorization for
presidential military action intruding on 
constitutionally protected
interests.2
2
tions, the standard of review of the domestic 
aspects of war has been anything but
deferential. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-89
(1952) (rejecting President Truman's attempt to seize steel 
mills to ensure material
for the Korean War effort); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 2, 107-32 (1866)
(holding that the President cannot establish a military commission 
to try an American
citizen when the civil courts remain open). Finally, the 
Court recently struck down
government actions involving foreign military 
decisions, such as the detention and
trial of alien enemy combatants captured and held outside the 
United States. See infra
Part LII.
20 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard 
H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process 
Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 TuEo-
RETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1, 7-8 (2004).
21 See id. at 4-8, 19, 25, 35-36, 44-45; see 
also Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Deten-
tion Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 153 (2004) (contending 
that the Court has prop-
erly insisted that the President can detain 
enemy combatants only with specific
congressional authorization).
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at 
War, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 51, 53-54,
77-99. Professor Sunstein identifies two 
other aspects of minimalism. First, courts
have upheld core due process values by 
insisting on fair hearings for those deprived
of liberty. Id. at 51, 54, 99-103. Second, 
judicial decisions have tended to be narrow
and incompletely theorized, thereby imposing 
only modest future constraints. Id. at
51, 54, 103-08; see also id. at 55, 77, 99 
(recognizing that sometimes minimalism is
inappropriate because courts must either 
uphold individual rights against egregious
violations or, conversely, defer to the President 
acting alone in emergency situations).
Professor Sunstein rejects the position of "Liberty Maximalists" 
like David Cole as
unrealistic (because judges will not aggressively protect 
freedom when the nation is at
risk) and undesirable (since the government often 
has a strong justification to
intrude on liberty during wartime). Id. at 50-52, 
108. Conversely, Sunstein contends
that "National Security Maximalists" like 
Justice Thomas, who advocate extreme 
judi-
cial deference, ignore that (1) the Constitution divides 
war powers between Congress
and the President; (2) the executive has political incentives 
to err on the side of exces-
sive protection of public safety and hence 
to short-change liberty interests; and (3)
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Professors Issacharoff, Pildes, and Sunstein are correct that the
Court has focused on whether Congress authorized or approved the
executive conduct being challenged. Unfortunately, this judicial
determination is usually subjective because the relevant legislation
does not unambiguously endorse or forbid particular acts, but rather
broadly empowers the President to take steps that he deems appropri-
ate to protect national security.23 In actual cases, such vague statutes
are interpreted as providing authorization when the Justices want to
avoid confronting the President 24 and as withholding authorization
when they wish to rebuke him.25 Therefore, analysis should center
political safeguards do not work when government restrictions on liberty target a
select group. Id. at 52-53, 65-75, 109.
23 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institu-
tional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 388-89, 402-05
(2004) (stressing that congressional intent is often unclear and thatjudges have strug-
gled to determine implied legislative authorization). Most pertinently, Congress's
directive to the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those
connected with the September 11 attacks was comparable to the broad legislative
delegations made in all declared wars and in other major conflicts like Vietnam, and
therefore the validity of Bush's actions should be evaluated in light of executive prac-
tices under such legislation. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the Wair on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2052, 2076, 2078-83
(2005) (citing relevant laws). By contrast, in more limited military engagements, such
as those against revolutionary France in the late 1790s and Somalia in 1993, Congress
has carefully restricted the President's resources, methods, targets, purposes, and
timetable. Id. at 2072-74. The meaning of such precisely drawn statutes rarely gener-
ates litigated disputes.
24 For example, in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Court construed a vague
statute as empowering President Roosevelt to convene a military commission to try
Nazi saboteurs. Id. at 38-39. The Court thereby sidestepped a showdown with FDR,
who had indicated his intent to execute these men regardless of the outcome of the
case. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (interpreting a federal
law that had reenacted verbatim the statute found in Quirin to have authorized mili-
tary commissions as no longer providing such power, and construing other legislation
that broadly authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to
fight al Qaeda as not permitting him to establish a military tribunal to try a trusted
aide of Osama bin Laden); see also infra notes 316-38 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that the implausibility of the Court's statutory interpretation suggested that its
true motive was to chastise President Bush).
The scholars who advocate a moderate approach candidly acknowledge that
judges have great latitude in interpreting generally worded statutes to ascertain
whether or not they endorse executive military action. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 20, at 37-38; Sunstein, supra note 22, at 97-99. Their efforts to resolve this
problem are unsatisfying. For instance, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes claim that
congressional approval is a "healthy fiction" because it always preserves the option for
Congress to intervene if it disagrees with the President (or with the Court's determi-
nation that a statute did or did not authorize his conduct). Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
[VOL, 82:31012
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not on an illusory search for congressional intent, but rather on iden-
tifying the extra-statutory factors that influenced the Court to exercise
its discretion to reach particular results.
In my view, the quest for a coherent jurisprudential framework is
futile because the Constitution's text and history do not clearly reveal
any single proper way to reconcile judicial review with war powers.
This uncertainty has led the Court to eschew black-letter rules in favor
of a flexible approach that reflects political and practical considera-
tions. Perhaps the only bedrock principle is that the Court will almost
never hear general claims that a military decision exceeded Con-
gress's powers under Article I or the President's authority under Arti-
cle I-for example, that the President has unconstitutionally
initiated hostilities because Congress did not formally declare war. 26
When a party challenges the exercise of war powers as violating his or
her individual legal rights, however, the Court usually has exercised judi-
cial review, albeit with great deference to the political branches. 27
Nonetheless, the degree of deference has varied with the facts and
note 20, at 38-40. The fiction becomes unhealthy, however, if the Court creatively
interprets a statute as denying the President a particular power to act, and that impo-
tence causes Americans to be harmed or killed. Professor Sunstein asserts that the
Court's demand for statutory specificity and clarity increases as the magnitude of the
intrusion on individual liberty grows. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 97-99. That pro-
position is debatable. For example., the prisoners in Quirin had not merely their lib-
erty but their lives at stake, yet the Court upheld their death sentences imposed by a
military commission that had not been clearly or particularly authorized by the statute
at issue. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 44-63, 68-77, 83, 100-06, 110-13, 123-27, 130-34, 153-63 and
accompanying text. But see Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts Offer
Any Answers, 157 MI. L. Riv. 180 (1998) (maintaining that judges can review
whether the President may lawfully send armed forces into combat, albeit with a
strong presumption of validity when Congress has expressly or implicitly supported
the action).
27 See infra notes 64, 78-81, 84, 117-22, 135-53, 163-75, 186 and accompanying
text. On the surface, the modern Court usually applies a familiar test to alleged con-
stitutional violations: The government cannot infringe due process, equal protection,
free speech, or other fundamental rights unless it employs the "least restrictive
means" to achieve a "compelling government interest." See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (creating this analysis). Strict application of this test,
however, would invariably result in the government's victory because national security
is the paradigmatic compelling interest, and judges typically cannot determine
whether the means chosen by the President (who has access to classified information
and expert military advisers) were the narrowest way to meet the threat. Moreover, in
many cases the legal fights at issue derive not from the Constitution but from federal
statutes, treaties, international law, or common law. Whatever the source of the indi-
vidual right, however, the Court has shown respect for the judgments of the coordi-
nate branches.
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circumstances of each case, as the Justices have prudentially 
balanced
several malleable factors.
One has been mentioned: The Court typically 
has yielded to the
President if he had legal authority for his action, 
either because Con-
gress approved of it (before or after it was taken) or Article 
I1 granted
him independent power to proceed. Except in rare 
cases, however,
such authorization is unclear.
28 Hence, judicial discussions of statu-
tory and constitutional meaning tend to mask 
three impressionistic
judgment calls.
First, the Court evaluates the gravity and immediacy 
of the mili-
tary crisis, as well as the necessity for the President's 
responsive mea-
sure. Not surprisingly, the Court has granted 
the President far more
latitude in addressing nation-threatening emergencies 
like the Civil
War and World War 11 than lesser conflicts. Of 
course, distinguishing
major from minor crises is very difficult for judges, who lack 
the Presi-
dent's access to military and foreign policy intelligence. 
The Court
often has glossed over the problem of second-guessing 
the President's
assessment that a particular conflict, such as 
the Korean War or the
War on Terrorism, is urgently serious and thus 
requires a specific and
strong response (e.g., taking over steel mills to ensure weapons 
pro-
duction or using military tribunals to 
try enemy combatants).29
Second, the Justices consider the egregiousness 
and magnitude
of the legal violation. For example, judges find unnecessary 
or arbi-
trary deprivations of bodily liberty more troublesome 
than temporary
suppression of speech to protect our troops.
3 0 Again, this factor has
built-in subjectivity, and hindsight often reveals that the heat 
of the
moment clouded judgment. To illustrate, few executive 
decisions
seem as monstrously unlawful as President Roosevelt's 
relocation of
Japanese-Americans, yet the Court sustained this action."' 
By contrast,
trying Osama bin Laden's henchman Yasir Hamdan 
by military com-
28 Article 11 simply dubs the President "Commander 
in Chief," without further
elaboration. This silence makes it plausible to 
argue that the President's unilateral
power should be broad, narrow, or intermediate. 
Likewise, most military authoriza-
tion statutes do not speak with lucidity and precision. 
See supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
29 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 584-89 (1952); Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2772-98.
30 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (declaring
that "the most elemental of liberty interests... 
[is] being free from physical detention
by one's own government").
31 Koremasu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
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mission would not strike most Americans as a huge 
legal problem, but
a majority of Justices thought otherwise.
32
Third, the Court calculates the likelihood that 
its orders will be
obeyed, which depends primarily upon the 
President's political
strength and secondarily upon whether the crisis 
is ongoing or has
passed.ss This last criterion is never articulated 
but often seems
pivotal.
In practice, the foregoing factors loom large. 
For instance, Abra-
ham Lincoln made it plain he would ignore 
any judicial decree that
clashed with his understanding that the 
Constitution implicitly
allowed the President to do anything 
necessary to save the Union.
3 4
The Court upheld his unilateral blockade of 
Confederate ports and
seizure of all merchant vessels there -actions 
Congress later specifi-
cally approved-despite the taking of 
property without due process.
35
By contrast, a year after the Civil War had ended 
and the politically
inept Andrew Johnson had become President, 
the Court granted a
writ of habeas corpus to an American citizen who 
had been sentenced
to death by a military tribunal and who successfully 
argued that the
Constitution gave him the fundamental right 
to an ordinary jury
trial.36 In the twentieth century, this pattern 
recurred. The Court
dared not confront Franklin Roosevelt-who enjoyed immense 
popu-
lar and congressional support-when he took 
constitutionally dubi-
ous steps to resolve the epic crisis of World War 
I1, but struck down
similar actions by his politically weaker successor 
Harry Truman dur-
ing the Korean War.
3 7
32 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 
271 (noting that " It] he public sup-
ported the Bush Military Commission proposal 
by a greater than 2-1 margin"). But see
id. at 262, 271-74, 281 (describing the different attitude 
of the legal, political, and
media elite, who reflect the post-Vietnam and 
Watergate distrust of executive actions
that threaten civil liberties and a strong commitment 
to individual rights).
33 See infra notes 115-27, 138, 149-53, 177 and accompanying 
text.
34 See infra Part II.B.1.
35 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), discussed 
infra notes 100-09
and accompanying text.
36 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118-27 (1866), 
examined infra notes
117-22 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 131-53, 163-78 and accompanying 
text (analyzing the major
cases); see also CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 256-75 (1989) (contending 
that federal courts often have
appropriately delayed decisions until after wartime 
emergencies have ended, thereby
facilitating a more sober evaluation of the legal 
issues, increasing the likelihood that
relevant information can be disclosed without 
threatening the military effort, and
reducing the danger of defiance by a President 
who has popular backing).
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In short, the rigor of judicial review waxes and wanes depending
upon the context of each case. Against this historical backdrop, it
would be premature to conclude that the four recent "enemy combat-
ant" decisions portend a permanent shift to heroic judicial defense of
individual rights against government overreaching in waging war.
Rather, it is more likely that these cases eventually will be grouped
with others in which the Court seized opportunities to vindicate legal
rights against politically vulnerable Presidents in perceived nonemer-
gency situations. Commentators who have lionized the Justices for
their "courage" in thwarting George Bush fail to grasp that "kicking
'em when they're down" exhibits no bravery and that this Court (like
its predecessors) would be unlikely to stand up to a popular President
in the midst of a major war.
The aforementioned ideas will be developed in four parts. Part I
examines the original meaning of the constitutional provisions on war
powers. Part II explains the Court's ad hoc balancing of multiple
legal and political factors, which usually--but not always-results in
upholding the government's actions. Part III places the recent cases
involving "enemy combatants" within that tradition. Part IV argues
that the Court has -properly declined to exercise ordinary judicial
review in the national security context. Rather, the Justices have rec-
ognized that separation of powers counsels extraordinary deference
because military decisions are (1) peculiarly within the institutional
competence of Congress and the President, and (2) matters of para-
mount national importance for which elected officials will be held
accountable. Accordingly, it is inevitable that the Court will be influ-
enced not merely by abstract legal principles but also by pragmatic
political considerations. Nonetheless, such political realities need not
induce the Court to uphold on the merits presidential measures that are
plainly unconstitutional, such as Roosevelt's incarceration of Japa-
nese-Americans. When a politically powerful President has made an
irreversible decision in seeming violation of a particular constitutional
provision because he believes doing so is essential to the war effort,
and when he will likely defy any judicial order to desist, the Court
should not affirmatively legitimate such conduct. Rather, it should
either decline to review the case altogether or employ a jurisdictional
avoidance mechanism such as the political question doctrine, thereby
shifting responsibility solely to elected officials. With this one excep-
tion, I would leave the Court's jurisprudence largely intact.
1o16 [VOL. 82--3
2007] THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1017
I. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Constitution on its face neither authorizes nor prohibits fed-
eral judges from deciding legal challenges to the exercise of war pow-
ers. Nonetheless, the most logical inference from the available
textual, structural, and historical evidence is that such judicial review
would be extremely limited . 3
38 In previous work, I have used a Neo-Federalist methodology, which recovers
the original meaning, intent, and understanding of the Constitution's text, structure,
and political theory in order to illuminate modern constitutional issues. See, e.g.,
RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 393, 397-99, 454, 470-72 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability];
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 695, 697-99 (2002). This analytical framework
cannot easily be applied to military affairs, however.
As originally designed, the Constitution (1) granted all powers to initiate and
prosecute war to Congress and the President, and (2) authorized the judiciary, in
litigated cases, to examine executive actions to ensure that they complied with federal
statutes and other government acts to determine whether they comported with the
Constitution. Unfortunately, neither the Constitution's text nor its drafting and ratifi-
cation history contain any direct evidence on the specific question of whether, and to
what extent, courts can review the political branches' exercise of war powers. To solve
this problem, I try to draw the most plausible inferences from the Constitution-
attempting to give effect to all of its provisions-and from its underlying structure
and political philosophy, as confirmed by early practice and precedent, See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA
L. REv. 735, 738-44, 822-43 (2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Inherent] (using this
approach to ascertain the contours of inherent federal judicial authority). This
inquiry reveals that the Constitution almost surely did not contemplate judicial review
of issues concerning the commencement or conduct of war, but likely permitted
review of claims that the exercise of military powers violated individual legal rights-
albeit with greater deference to the political branches than would be shown in purely
domestic affairs.
Subsequent history has demonstrated, however, that the Court has been unable
to define the precise scope of appropriate deference in a legally principled way.
Instead, it has decided cases based upon their particular facts and circumstances in
light of political and practical considerations. My main goal is to provide an honest
description and analysis of this precedent. In attempting to identify the nonlegal
factors that have influenced the Justices, I owe an intellectual debt to legal realists, to
scholars who have applied decisionmaking psychology to adjudication, and to politi-
cal scientists who have shown that judges seek to rationally maximize their policy pref-
erences and engage in strategic behavior with other government officials. For a
discussion of such work, see Tracey E. George & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitu-
tional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1265, 1273-76 (2002) (reviewing MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, CONSTiTUTIONAL PROCESS (2000)); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have
the Constitutional Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LECis. 319,
338-40 (2005) [hereinafter Pushaw, Congress].
In short, although a Neo-Federalist perspective yields some valuable insights
about judicial review of war powers, it does not supply workable legal rules that courts
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Although the Constitution does not contain a specific clause pro-
viding that courts can determine whether political officials have com-
plied with the document's requirements, such power flows from the
Constitution's structure and political theory.3 3 As Alexander Hamil-
ton explained in The Federalist No. 78, only federal judges, who had
been appointed through a selective process and guaranteed indepen-
dence, could be fully trusted to exercise the 'judicial power" of decid-
ing cases according to the law-including the supreme and
fundamental law of the sovereign People, the Constitution.40 Moreo-
ver, he stressed that the judiciary alone could impartially ascertain
whether the elected branches had obeyed the written limits on their
own power and had not violated individual legal rights.4 In short,
Hamilton asserted that the Constitution created a "natural presump-
tion" favoring judicial review.42 Nonetheless, he recognized that this
presumption could be rebutted by "particular provisions in the
[C] onstitution" that gave Congress or the President ultimate decision-
making authority.43
Although The Federalist No. 78 did not list examples of such politi-
cal questions, Hamilton's related essays (and the writings of other
leading Federalists) indicate that the actual process of making war
and peace could not be examinedjudicially. Military powers, which in
England had been committed entirely to the royal executive (except
can apply impartially and consistently. Indeed, the failure of conventional legal analy-
sis in this area seems to be intractable and universal, as reflected in Cicero's maxim
that "during war law is silent." See Epstein et al., supra note 17, at 3.
Outside of the unique context of military affairs, however, I cling to the belief
that federal courts can, and should, formulate and apply rules of law rooted in the
Constitution's text, structure, history, and early precedent. See Pushaw, Congress,
supra, 338-53.
39 For a detailed explanation of this point, see Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 38,
at 407-35.
40 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). For similar claims, see 2 THE DEBATES [N THE SEVERAL STATE CONvE.rrONs
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445-46, 478-81, 489 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES] (James Wilson); 2 MAX FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVErNON 73-78 (rev. ed. 1937) (James Madison).
41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 524-27; see
also RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Article II's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions
of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 492, 496-502 (1994) (documenting that
most other Founders shared Hamilton's understanding that independent courts
would exercise judicial review).
42 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 524-25.
43 Id.; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question
Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1165,
1196-200 (2002) (recommending that the Court resurrect Hamilton's approach).
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for funding the armed forces) ,44 were in the American Constitution
distributed between Congress and the President.
45 Article I autho-
rizes Congress to provide for the common 
defense, 46 declare war,
47
"raise and support" the army (subject to a two-year time limit on any
appropriation) ,48 "provide and maintain a Navy,"
49 regulate the land
and naval forces, 5
0 oversee the President's prosecution 
of the war,51
44 See MONTEsQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
bk. XI, ch. 6, paras. 61-62 (David
Wallace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent, 
trans., Univ. of California Press 1977) (1798)
(arguing that the executive should have full control 
over military operations, with the
legislative check limited to terminating 
funding); Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at
212-17 (describing the king's power to declare war, 
regulate the army and navy, and
execute treaties, as well as Parliament's 
ability to curb unwanted military action
through its control over the purse). Locke claimed 
that the executive, in an emer-
gency, could "act according to discretion 
for the public good, without prescription 
of
the law, and sometimes even against it" 
because the legislature was too slow and
numerous to take effective measures. SeeJOHN 
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GoV-
ERNMENT 81-82 (.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1966) 
(1690).
45 See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 40, at 465 (not-
ing that the Constitution grants the President 
one traditional executive power-
directing the armed forces-but not others 
such as declaring war and regulating the
armed forces); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra 
note 38, at 401, 430-31, 507-09
(discussing this allocation of military power between 
Congress and the President as
reflecting an overarching purpose of balancing 
efficiency against the need for govern-
ment responsibility and protection of liberty); Sunstein, 
supra note 22, at 52, 66-68
(contending that the Constitution's text and history 
refute the assertion that the Pres-
ident alone protects national security).
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
47 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11. The drafters substituted 
the word "declare" for "make,"
thereby clarifying that the President would 
conduct military operations after war had
begun and would retain the traditional executive 
power to meet sudden attacks. See
FAtRAND, supra note 40, at 318-19 (citing, among others, 
Madison, Elbridge Gerry,
and Rufus King).
48 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12. The Framers inserted 
this deadline to force Con-
gress to consider whether a war should 
continue rather than allowing Congress 
to
give the President permanent funding for 
armies at his command. See THE FEDERAL-
iST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, 
at 168-71.
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. Furthermore, 
Congress can organize the militia
and provide for calling it forth to enforce 
federal laws, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions. Id. cls. 15-16.
50 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. Congress also has power 
to define and punish piracies and
"offenses against the law of Nations." Id. cl. 
10.
51 Article I's grant of "legislative power" has 
always, and properly, been construed
as including the traditional function of monitoring 
the executive. See, e.g., WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *155 (describing Parliament's 
power to investigate the
King's officials and hold them responsible 
for their actions); Gerhard Casper, An
Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 
30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
211, 224-33 (1989) (detailing Congress's interaction 
with President Washington
regarding military affairs, including various 
oversight activities).
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and suspend the writ of habeas corpus when an invasion or rebellion
imperils the public safety.5 2 Article II makes the President the reposi-
tory of "executive power"5 3 and the "Commander in Chief."5 4 The
Framers thereby established a unitary executive with the singular insti-
tutional capacity for taking quick, energetic, decisive action based on
the informed advice of subordinate officials.55 These qualities were
especially important in military affairs5 6 :
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exer-
cise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the
direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength, forms [a] usual and essential part
in the definition of the executive authority.5 7
The Constitution did not describe the existence (much less the
parameters) of the President's power to proceed absent a formal dec-
52 "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Although this clause does not explicitly state that "Congress" alone
can suspend habeas, this interpretation seems unavoidable given the placement of
this provision in Article I (which pertains exclusively to Congress) and longstanding
English practice. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 91-92, 101 (1807).
53 U.S. CONST. art. i1, § 1, cf. 1. The President also has a correlative duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. art. 1I, § 3. Scholars have suggested
that this clause repudiated the Lockean notion of an executive prerogative to act
without (or even contrary to) legislation. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT
7-8, 286-87 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984).
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Clause 2 authorizes the President to "make trea-
ties," which become effective upon ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. In this
Article, I do not analyze such nonmilitary foreign affairs powers, except to note their
obvious connection to the protection of national security. See Powell, supra note 12,
at 564-66.
55 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 471-73
(contrasting the "[dlecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" of the single executive
magistrate with the deliberateness, conciliation, and public nature of the multi-mem-
ber legislature); see also DEATES, supra note 40, at 447 (James Wilson) (same); THE
FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 40, at 434-36 (stressing that the President
could negotiate treaties because of his ability to act quickly based upon information
that was often confidential).
56 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 471
("Energy in the Executive... is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks .... "); id. at 476 (same).
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 40, at 500; see Pow-
ell, supra note 12, at 568-74 (explaining that the President, as Commander in Chief,
has power to deploy troops and to conduct and control military operations).
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laration of war or similar authorization, s and scholars have heatedly
debated this issue.59 As a practical matter, however, Presidents have
long asserted power to take military action unilaterally, and indeed
have become dominant in this area.60 Nonetheless, Congress can
58 Even supporters of robust congressional war power concede that the President
has independent authority to respond to sudden attacks. See, e.g., John Hart Ely,
Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1388
(1988). For instance, Professor Monaghan rejects assertions of broad inherent presi-
dential power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, but acknowledges a
narrow residual authority to act immediately in a genuine national emergency and
only later seek congressional approval. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-11, 24-38 (1993); see also id. at 11, 61-74 (recogniz-
ing a similarly limited executive power to protect United States personnel, property,
and instrumentalities).
59 The prevailing view is that the Constitution granted Congress exclusive power
.to declare war" or otherwise authorize the use of military force, but that Congress has
failed to guard this prerogative from presidential encroachment. See, e.g., ELY, supra
note 11, at 3-10; FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 11, at 14-15; see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 239-41
(2002) (maintaining that Congress alone has power to initiate war, and that only the
President can conduct that war); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69
U. CHI. L. REv. 1543, 1609-35 (2002) (arguing that Congress can "declare war" by
either formal proclamation or military assault and that the President cannot initiate
"war" without legislative approval, but that the President unilaterally can defend the
nation against attack and use military threats and force that fall short of creating a
state of "war").
By contrast, Professor Yoo has claimed that the Constitution does not establish
any particular process for initiating war (as it does for enacting statutes and ratifying
treaties), but rather confers on Congress and the President all military powers and
allows them to work out the details. SeeYoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 173-74,
241, 252-64, 288-90, 295-96, 300, 305; Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1662-84. There-
fore, the President can begin and manage the war as part of his authority as Com-
mander in Chief and his executive power, subject to congressional control through
appropriations and impeachment. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 174,
196-97, 218, 241-90, 295-96, 300, 305; Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1658-59, 1665,
1674, 1680-83. Professor Yoo asserts that the Declare War Clause merely gave to Con-
gress the 'Juridical" power of determining whether we were at war with another
nation, thereby triggering the international laws of war and domestic constitutional
military authority. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 204-06, 242-50, 288, 295;
Yoo, War, supra note 12, at 1667-73, 1679.
60 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 68; supra note 1I (citing numerous academics
who have also recognized, and criticized, this development). Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith maintain that neither the Framers nor any Presidents have believed that
using military force required a prior congressional declaration of war, as evidenced by
America's involvement in hundreds of undeclared wars dating back to the beginning
of the Republic. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 2057-62.
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check the executive's military adventurism in many 
ways-most obvi-
ously, by allowing funding to lapse 
or otherwise cutting it off.
6 1
Regardless of the precise allocation of war powers 
between Con-
gress and the President, the pertinent point is that 
these two depart-
ments alone were given all the tools necessary to 
form, support, and
direct the military. In the words of Hamilton:
These powers ought to exist without limitation: 
Because it is impos-
sible to foresee or define the extent and variety 
of national exigen-
cies, or the correspondent extent & variety of 
the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances 
that endanger the
safety of nations are infinite; and for this 
reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power 
to which the care of it
is committed. This power ought to be co-extensive 
with all the pos-
sible combinations of such circumstances; 
and ought to be under
the direction of the same councils, which are 
appointed to preside
over the common defence.
62
Correspondingly, the Constitution excludes 
the judiciary from mak-
ing, executing, or reviewing decisions such 
as going to war, con-
61 See supra notes 48, 59 and accompanying text. 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 of
the Constitution restricts any appropriations "Iit]o raise and 
support armies" to a two-
year term. When that period expires, funding automatically 
ceases, and the President
must await new appropriations. Moreover, Congress's 
general spending power
includes discretion to refuse to provide financial 
support at all, to approve funding
for less than two years, or to repeal a previous statutory 
appropriation. The Constitu-
tion's two-year appropriations limit and its entrusting 
of the power of the military
purse to Congress reflects an obvious purpose to 
avoid the permanent financing of
standing armies at the President's disposal, which 
struck the Framers as an invitation
to tyranny. See supra note 48 and accompanying 
text.
For better or worse, it would be impossible to implement 
this precise original
understanding today. The American people and 
their government long ago con-
cluded that national security demanded a large, 
continuously funded military so that
the President can respond swiftly and decisively 
to emergencies. See Yoo, Continua-
tion, supra note 12, at 299-300. Particularly after Pearl 
Harbor and 9/11, it would be
quixotic to argue that the President should always 
await special congressional fiscal
allocations before he can defend the country.
Of course, Congress can express its disagreement with 
the President's conduct of
a war by reducing or terminating funding for 
it (or by decreasing the size of the
armed forces themselves). Conversely, congressional appropriations 
for the military
are a form of authorization to the President to wage 
war. See Note, Recapturing the War
Power, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1815, 1816-21 (2006).
62 THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 40, at 147; see also
THE FEDERALisT No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 40, 
at 270 (emphasizing that
even peaceful nations must be prepared to meet the 
unforeseen ambition of another
country).
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ducting military operations, funding them, and negotiating with the
enemy.6
3
Unfortunately, the Framers and Ratifiers never mentioned what
would happen if someone challenged the exercise of war powers not
as inconsistent with Articles I or II, but rather as violating his or her
individual legal rights. Perhaps they thought that military affairs
inherently involved political questions in all circumstances. Con-
versely, it is possible that they contemplated regular judicial review
whenever individual rights were at stake. The most reasonable conclu-
sion, however, is that the Founders would have sought to give effect
both to the Constitution's provisions designed to protect national
defense and to its institution of judicial review. The Supreme Court
has achieved this goal by adopting the compromise approach of tak-
ing jurisdiction but showing healthy deference to the political
branches. 64
63 See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 176-82, 269-70, 284, 287-90, 295-96,
300 (demonstrating that the extensive Convention and Ratification debates contain
no suggestion that federal courts could or would review the exercise of war powers by
Congress or the President, who were given complete authority in this area and were
expected to check each other); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 38, at 507-08
(contending that the Constitution's scheme of shared legislative-executive power over
warmaking impliedly excluded the judiciary).
Thus, I agree with the Court's consistent refusal to decide political questions
involving whether the President can use military force in the absence of a declaration
of war or other congressional authorization. See infra Part I. Conversely, I reject
Dean Koh's argument that federal courts should vigorously review executive branch
assertions of warmaking power in order to restore the proper constitutional balance
in making decisions about national security. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255
(1988).
The judiciary's only explicit constitutional role in the military context was to con-
duct impartial treason trials involving persons accused of "levying war" against the
United States or "adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S.
CONST. art. 1II, § 3. For an illuminating recent analysis of this provision, see Carlton
F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Prob-
lem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863 (2006) (maintaining that this clause guarantees a criminal
trial in an ordinary federal court to persons subject to the law of treason-a category
that includes both American citizens and aliens present in the United States who are
not accompanying an invading military force). As originally understood, this Treason
Clause may have limited the ability of the political branches to deprive alleged traitors
of this judicial forum and instead remit them to military jurisdiction.
64 For a defense of the Court's position, see Yoo, supra note 19, at 428-31,
433-36, 440, 450-51; see also Sunstein, supra note 22, at 66 ("Structural concerns,
along with simple prudence, argue in favor of considerable judicial deference to pres-
idential choices when national security is at risk."). Two other scholars have provided
especially insightful explanations of the Court's approach.
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II. JURISPRUDENCE ON WAR POWERS
A. The Marshall Court
In Marbury v. Madison,65 Chief Justice Marshall simultaneously
announced the power ofjudicial review66 but recognized certain ques-
tions to be "political,"67 including the President's conduct of military
affairs and his foreign policy decisions that did not transgress individ-
ual rights. 68 The Marshall Court also deemed nonjusticiable several
First, Professor McGinnis has argued that, for constitutional and political
reasons, the President has the strongest interest in war powers, whereas the judiciary
places the least value on this subject because it lacks the institutional capacity to make
sound assessments and because an incorrect decision would have dramatic effects that
would harm its prestige. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers,
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 305-08, 316-18. He finds it unsur-
prising that courts have tended to defer to the President's military decisions and leave
the primary checking role to Congress, thereby maximizing their power over the area
they care about most-protecting individual rights in domestic cases. See id. at
293-94, 306-08, 316-18.
Second, Professor Nzelibe applauds the federaljudiciary's abstention from decid-
ing constitutional questions about the allocation of foreign-affairs powers on the
ground that courts have peculiar institutional disadvantages in this area compared to
the political branches, such as a lack of resources to track the evolution of interna-
tional norms and an absence of authoritativeness and legitimacy in determining mat-
ters of foreign policy. SeeJide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IowA L.
REv. 941, 944-45, 975-99 (2004). He does recognize, however, that judicial review
may be justified when a decision about foreign affairs affects individual rights or
domestic property, although even then courts properly show substantial respect for
the judgments of the political departments. See id. at 999-1006.
For an opposing view, see Kalyani Robbins, Framers' Intent and Military Power: Has
Supreme Court Deference to the Military Gone Too Far, 78 OR. L. REv. 767, 776-81 (1999)
(contending that the Constitution's inclusion of specific provisions that recognize the
need for deference to the military in cases of urgent necessity, such as the Suspension
Clause, implies that courts should enforce all other constitutional rights that are not
so expressly limited).
65 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66 Id. at 176-80.
67 Id. at 169-71.
68 Id. at 166-67. SeeYoo, supra note 19, at 432-33 (making this point to rebut the
argument that it is inconsistent to endorse judicial review yet deny its applicability to
cases involving war initiation). Indeed, a decade before Marbuy, the Justices declined
to render an advisory opinion on legal questions stemming from America's neutral
status in the war between England and France-a decision driven both by constitu-
tional interpretation and by a desire to avoid direct judicial involvement in the strug-
gle between Congress and the executive over control of foreign relations. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: Advisory Opinions
in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1997) (book review).
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congressional powers, such as declaring war 69 and determining the
rights of foreigners during wartime. 70 The Chief Justice repeatedly
stressed that such political decisions about military matters affected
the entire country, and that therefore any disputes could be resolved
only through the national political process (i.e., appealing to Con-
gress or the President to change their policies and, if they failed to do
so, electing different officials).71
The Court's most detailed analysis came in Martin v. Mott,72 in
which it refused to reach the merits of the President's decision to call
forth the militia to defend against what he concluded was a credible
threat of invasion. 73 This holding reflected three concerns. First,
Congress had exercised its Article I powers by granting the President
sole discretion to determine whether an emergency justified enlisting
the help of the militia.7 4 Second, he had to base military decisions on
information that was often confidential and on evidence that might be
inadmissible in court.75 Third, the President as Commander in Chief
could not be forced to disclose the facts supporting his decision to a
judge or jury for possible second-guessing. 76 Rather, his actions were
subject only to the political scrutiny of the electoral process and con-
gressional oversight.77
Despite these "political question" rulings, however, the Marshall
Court remained open to hearing allegations that the President, in
exercising his war powers, had breached a legal duty in a way that
violated the claimant's rights. The earliest cases arose when Congress,
instead of declaring a "general" war against Revolutionary France and
thereby triggering the full range of executive authority, approved only
"partial" armed hostilities limited to certain objectives, places, and
times. 78 For instance, in Little v. Barreme,79 the Court concluded that
69 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 29 (1801).
70 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818).
71 See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197; Marbuwy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
164-71.
72 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
73 Id. at 28-33. In Martin, a citizen who had been fined for refusing to report for
military duty claimed that a genuine emergency did not exist that would have justified
recruiting the militia. Id. at 23-24, 29-33.
74 id. at 28-32.
75 Id. at 31.
76 Id. at 30-33.
77 Id. at 32.
78 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45-46 (1800) (using this distinction to
find that a state of "war" existed between America and France, despite the absence of
a formal declaration). The definitive study is ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QuAst-WAR:
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the President did not have Article II power to exceed 
Congress's
explicit directive to seize ships going "to" French 
ports by ordering
the capture of ships going "to [and] from" France.
0 The Court there-
fore held that an American officer who had relied upon 
that faulty
executive order in forcibly taking a Danish ship 
had to pay damages to
the shipowner.8 1 Even then, however, the Court 
acknowledged the
political branches' vast authority in 
this field.8 2
As is true in most areas of constitutional law, the 
Marshall Court
established an analytical framework that has proved 
enduring, even as
details have continued to evolve. Generally speaking, 
military actions
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE 
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at
124-30 (1966).
79 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
80 Id. at 176-79.
81 Id. at 179.
82 See id. at 177-79 (emphasizing the President's broad 
powers in directing mili-
tary officers and his independent authority to meet 
emergencies, but suggesting that
Congress could specify the parameters of the exercise 
of executive war powers); see
also Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 37-40 (concluding that Congress's 
hostile conduct towards
France-for example, cutting off diplomatic 
relations and funding military actions
against that nation-made France an "enemy" 
as that word was used in a 1799 federal
law that gave United States commanders 
a bonus if they recaptured American
merchant ships from "enemies"); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 1, 7-8, 44-45
(1801) (applying a similar analysis in upholding the seizure 
of a ship pursuant to a
statute). In both Bas and Talbot, the Court disclaimed 
any independent power to
determine whether a state of war existed 
(a legislative prerogative), but rather
asserted that it was merely following Congress's 
guidelines. To similar effect is Brown
v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), which 
held that Congress's general
authorization to the President to wage the War 
of 1812 did not include the specific
power to seize persons or confiscate enemy property 
located in the United States. Id.
at 122-27; see Corn, supra note 26, at 205-12 
(interpreting these early decisions as
establishing that the executive branch cannot 
lawfully act contrary to the express will
of Congress in authorizing and regulating armed 
conflict).
Professor Wuerth has argued that in Little and 
in "War of 1812" cases like Brown,
courts refused to defer to executive claims 
of inherent constitutional authority to
imprison American citizens, no matter how compelling 
the military necessity. Ingrid
Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy 
Combatants": Modern Lessons from
Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1567, 1568-69, 1580-93 (2004). She
maintains that this precedent, and many 
subsequent decisions, direct judges to
require specific congressional authorization 
for the detention of citizens-including
those held as enemy combatants in the War 
on Terrorism. See id. at 1607-15; see also
id. at 1610 (contending that, even when the President 
acts under a statute, a court
must determine whether his conduct comports 
with the Constitution and interna-
tional law). Although Professor Wuerth has done admirable 
historical analysis, I disa-
gree with her conclusion that the War of 
1812 cases survived the Supreme Court's
approval of the President's detention and trial 
of citizens during the Civil War and
World War 11, See infra Parts II.B-D.
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per se are treated as political questions.8 3 When such decisions alleg-
edly violate individual rights, however, courts have exercised judicial
power, albeit with keen sensitivity to the government's legitimate pre-
rogatives.8 4 The amount of deference depends on the particular con-
text of each case, although a few considerations have emerged as
consistently important. Examination of the main decisions helps to
isolate those factors.
B. The Civil War Era
The Civil War and Reconstruction transformed the constitutional
landscape. Most pertinently for present purposes, Lincoln success-
83 The seminal case is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There the
Taney Court declined to entertain a claim that Rhode Island's government, which
had been in existence since receiving a colonial charter in 1663, did not have a
.republican form" because it had not been established pursuant to a popular Conven-
tion that created a truly representative legislature, as had the upstart government that
brought the suit. Id. at 34-45. This holding rested on two considerations. First,
Congress had recognized the charter government as the legitimate one, and the Presi-
dent (with statutory authorization) had taken measures to call out the militia to sup-
press the rival government. Id. at 42-45. Second, overturning these decisions would
result in voiding all the acts of Rhode Island's charter government, which would cre-
ate political and legal chaos. Id. at 38-39. In other cases, however, the Court decided
questions that seemed political. See, e.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603,
614-15 (1850) (ruling that the President, absent congressional approval, could not
annex conquered territory to the United States).
84 For a relatively rare example of a successful suit, see Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133-35 (1851) (invalidating an army officer's seizure of private
property during the Mexican War where no congressional authorization existed and
no emergencyjustification had been shown); see also CLIrON RoSSiTR, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 17 (1976) (concluding that the Court usually
defers, but occasionally "afford[s] a grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably
unwarranted use of presidential or military power"); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial
Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REv. 227, 259-62, 269-74,
283-92, 304-05, 326-27 (1991) (documenting the Court's adjudication of numerous
cases touching on foreign policy when the plaintiff claimed a violation of individual
rights, but noting its application of lenient standards, such as accepting as the control-
ling law the legal interpretation previously made by political officials); cf Shira A.
Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a
Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. Rxv. 795, 796-97, 815, 852 (2004) (arguing that judicial
deference is appropriate only in the case of "a truly military decision" such as a battle-
field directive, and not when a President such as George Bush makes an unsupported
assertion that a "war" power must be exercised in seeming violation of a constitutional
right).
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fully asserted sweeping presidential authority that seemed to run afoul
of several constitutional provisions .
5
1. Lincoln's View of the Constitution During Wartime
The President responded swiftly to the assault on Fort Sumter in
April 1861 by unilaterally ordering a blockade of Confederate ports
and the summary seizure of all merchant vessels (and their cargoes)
within the forbidden zone-even against shipowners who were
unaware of the blockade.86 With similar boldness, Lincoln suspended
the writ of habeas corpus, 7 even though the Constitution lodged that
power in Congress. 8 Likewise, Lincoln banned disloyal speech and
publications despite possible First Amendment concerns 9 and estab-
lished military tribunals with broad jurisdiction.90 Especially breath-
taking was Lincoln's claim that his power as Commander in Chief
allowed him to free all the slaves in rebellious areas,91 a policy judg-
ment that appeared to be quintessentially legislative 92 (not to mention
85 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 7-8, 15-25, 115-95 (2003)
(detailing such drastic measures but generally defending their legitimacy); MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1993).
86 These actions, which appeared to violate the Fifth Amendment, were upheld
in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665-82 (1862), discussed infta notes 100-09
and accompanying text.
87 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney,
C.J.) (describing and condemning this suspension).
88 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (analyzing habeas corpus). Lincoln
ordered the detention of thousands of civilians without trial. See FARBER, supra note
85, at 19-20, 144, 157; NEELY, supra note 85, at 113-38.
89 See FARBER, supra note 85, at 17, 118, 144, 164, 170-74 (citing numerous
examples).
90 See id. at 8, 20, 144-46, 163-75; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2831-34 (2006) (Thomas,J., dissenting) (describing Lincoln's military commissions).
Lincoln also expanded the military, called for volunteers, and committed millions of
dollars to the war effort, despite the Constitution's delegation of such powers to
Congress. See FARBER, supra note 85, at 17-18, 117-20, 132-33, 135-38, 192, 196-97.
91 See PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 187-89
(1994).
92 The Emancipation Proclamation made concrete Lincoln's earlier statements
that, as President, he would not obey the Court's constitutional interpretation in Dred
Scott. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney
General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1017, 1022 (1987). Even Justice Curtis, an
ardent Unionist who had resigned from the Court to protest Dred Scott, lamented that
Lincoln had exceeded his Article I1 powers with the Emancipation Proclamation and
some of his other actions. See 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 306-35
(Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1879); cf FARBER, supra note 85, at 19, 21, 144-45,
152-57 (conceding the extraordinary nature of this Proclamation, noting that it
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beyond the federal government's authority according 
to Dred Scott v.
Sand ford-3).
Chief Justice Taney and a minority of his colleagues 
attempted to
check Lincoln through a formal interpretation 
of the Constitution.
The majority of Justices, however, pragmatically adopted a hands-off
approach.
The first major case was Ex parte Menyman,
94 in which Taney tried
to thwart Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus 
on two grounds.
First, the placement of the Suspension Clause 
in Article I and histori-
cal practice revealed that Congress alone had this power.
9 5 Second,
Article III courts had a vital role in vindicating 
the due process rights
of citizens who had been unlawfully detained -including 
Merryman,
who had been summarily thrown into a military 
prison for his Confed-
erate leanings.96 Lincoln disregarded Taney's 
order to release Mer-
ryman and instead told Congress that the 
Constitution implicitly
permitted the President to do anything he deemed 
necessary to save
the Union.97 He famously asked: "Are all the 
laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, 
lest that one be
violated"?98 Two years later, Congress belatedly 
ratified Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus.
99
wiped out millions of dollars in property rights 
and hence raised grave questions
under the Fifth Amendment, but ultimately finding 
it justified as a war measure).
93 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
94 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney, 
C.J.).
95 Id. at 148-52.
96 Id. at 147-49, 152-53.
97 See REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 38-39 (quoting Abraham 
Lincoln, Message to
Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6 COMPLETE WORKxS 
OF ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN 297, 309 (John A. Nicolay and John Hay eds., 1905)); 
see also FARBER, supra note
85, at 188-89 (noting that Menyman is the only instance 
of a President disobeying a
direct court order); Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 260-61 (4th ed. 1997).
98 See REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 38. The Constitution 
provides that the habeas
writ "shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Lincoln's 
argument that this
Clause did not expressly say whether "Congress" 
or "the President" could suspend the
writ, and that therefore he could do so, conflicts 
with the Constitution's structure,
history, and precedent. See supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. Far more supporta-
ble is Lincoln's claim that the President can take 
an otherwise unlawful action if nec-
essary to preserve the entire constitutional government. 
See supra notes 44, 58 and
accompanying text; infra note 109. For example, Merryman involved 
Lincoln's suspen-
sion of habeas between Washington and Philadelphia 
to address the real danger that
Maryland would join the Confederacy, which would have cut off 
the federal govern-
ment from the North and crippled the Union. See 
FARBER, supra note 85, at 16-17,
19-20, 117, 157-63, 192-95.
99 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
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Unlike Taney, most of the other Justices got the message. In The
Prize Cases,'00 the Court sustained Lincoln's blockade of Confederate
ports and his seizure without due process of all transgressing vessels
and their cargoes. 10 1 The majority held that the President's power as
Commander in Chief included unreviewable discretion to "'deter-
mine what degree of force the crisis demands,'"102 such as the deploy-
ment of warships to enforce the blockade. 10 3 Whether Lincoln had
acted within the scope of his constitutional duties was "a question to
be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions
and acts of the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted." 10 4 The Court also rejected the argument that
Lincoln had acted unlawfully because Congress had not declared war
or specifically authorized his measures, instead creatively interpreting
existing federal laws as generally empowering the President to employ
the army and navy to quell domestic insurrections.' 0 5 Moreover, the
Court maintained that Congress's later approval of Lincoln's order
resolved any potential legal problems. 10 6 Chief Justice Taney joined
Justice Nelson's dissent, which contended that Lincoln had lacked
constitutional authority to unilaterally order the blockade and
seizures and that later congressional endorsement could not cure this
unconstitutional usurpation.1 0 7
The Prize Cases seemingly accepted Lincoln's claim that Article II
grants the President virtually unlimited-and judicially unreview-
able-power to take any actions he considers essential to address an
emergency.10 8 Nonetheless, the Court strained to avoid the full impli-
100 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
101 Id. at 665-82.
102 Id. at 670.
103 Id. at 666-70.
104 Id. at 670.
105 Id. at 668 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 443; Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424). The Court acknowledged, however, that the President had the
duty to resist a rebellion or invasion by force without waiting for particular congres-
sional authorization. Id. at 668-69. This Article II power to respond militarily to an
emergency, however, did not amount to a declaration or initiation of war. Id. at 660,
668.
106 Id. at 670-71 (setting forth statute).
107 See id. at 697-98 (Nelson, J., dissenting, joined by Taney, C.J., and Catron and
Clifford, JJ.) (stressing that only Congress, not the President, could determine that a
state of war existed).
108 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 691 (2004) (book review) (arguing that Lincoln correctly believed
that the President's sworn constitutional duty to "preserve, protect and defend" the
entire Constitution (and the nation) supplied a "meta-principle" of interpretation: All
actions necessary to save the Union justified the temporary sacrifice of individual con-
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cations of this theory by emphasizing Congress's constitutional role,
both in generally authorizing Presidents to put down rebellions and in
specifically endorsing Lincoln's possibly extra-constitutional
measures.10 9
The judiciary's kid-gloves approach continued in Ex parte
Vallandigham, °10 which involved a constitutional challenge to a sen-
tence imposed by a military commission established by a U.S. Army
stitutional provisions whose full enforcement would threaten to destroy the country).
As Lincoln put it: "'[Measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the [C]onstitution, through the pres-
ervation of the nation."' See id. at 721 (quoting Letter from Abraham Lincoln to
Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
1859-1865, at 585, 585 (Dan E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989)).
109 Some scholars have contended that Article I1 does not grant the President
bottomless implied authority to resolve national crises. See supra note 58 (citing
Professors Ely and Monaghan). Rather, executive actions such as those taken by Lin-
coln are unconstitutional, and the President must later request Congress's approval-
and can be held accountable through impeachment or other sanctions if Congress
determines that the President lacked justification for his actions. See FISHER, PRESI-
DENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 11, at 263; Note, supra note 61, at 1829-30 n.83.
Indeed, even Lincoln conceded that many of his actions were of dubious constitution-
ality and sought later endorsement of them from Congress. He also understood that
only Congress could appropriate the funds necessary to wage the war successfully. See
FARBER, supra note 85, at 18-19, 24, 118, 137-45, 192-95, 197 (acknowledging that
the President must have some independent ability to defend the nation in true emer-
gencies, but maintaining that he must remain legally and morally answerable for his
conduct to Congress); see also David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent
Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 174-80, 192-93 (2002) (asserting that
Lincoln properly recognized the longstanding Anglo-American principle of "retroac-
tive ratification" whereby the President could break the law in an emergency and then
seek congressional approval for his actions). But see CORWIN, supra note 53, at 23-24,
167 (concluding that Lincoln initially assumed that the validity of his interim emer-
gency measures depended upon later legislative ratification, but that by 1863 he had
come to believe that the President had extraordinary independent constitutional
authority in wartime).
I reject the notion that Congress can make unconstitutional conduct constitu-
tional. Rather, Article 1I either does or does not give the President power to respond
to a crisis that imperils America, I believe that the Constitution necessarily provides
for its own preservation, and that only the President is institutionally equipped to save
the nation in such a situation. The reason is structural: Whereas Congress and the
courts are in session for fixed periods, the President alone is continuously on duty
and thus can immediately deal with sudden attacks and rebellions. Moreover, even if
Congress happens to be in session when an emergency arises, its large membership
prevents the immediate action that may be necessary to preserve the status quo. For a
detailed elaboration of the foregoing thesis, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTI-
TUTION 131-204, 351-63 (2005).
110 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
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general in conformity with instructions approved 
by Lincoln. 11 The
Court held that it could not "review or pronounce 
any opinion upon
the proceedings of a military commission
1 1 2 or otherwise judge the
actions of the executive branch in such matters.
1 13 Indeed, Presidents
and commanders had used military tribunals 
without congressional
authorization or judicial interference in every significant war 
dating
back to the Revolution. 
1 1 4
After Lincoln prevailed in his initial dispute 
with Taney, the
Court did not invalidate any of Lincoln's wartime 
measures. Rather, it
determined either that the issues were nonjusticiable or that the 
Con-
stitution permitted his actions. The Civil War 
demonstrated that a
President can disregard various provisions of the 
Constitution if he
determines that doing so is necessary to save our 
entire constitutional
form of government, as tong as he enjoys congressional support 
(even
retroactively) and he is willing and able to ignore any adverse 
court
judgment. 11-
2. Reconstruction-Era Limits on the Executive
Lincoln named as his Vice President Andrew 
Johnson, a South-
ern Democrat who had remained loyal to the 
Union. When Johnson
11 Ild. at 243, 2 4 8 .
112 Id. at 252; see also id. at 253 (ruling that the Supreme 
Court lacked statutory
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a military commission).
113 Id. at 254 (citing Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 
19, 28-35 (1827)).
114 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 89-90 (compiling numerous 
examples). Such mili-
tary commissions were especially common during 
the Civil War. See Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2831-33 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citing military
records). Interestingly, the Court deferred to Andrew Johnson 
when he convened a
military tribunal to try Lincoln's assassin and 
accomplices and suspended their right
to habeas corpus. See ROSSITER, supra note 84, 
at 110-13.
115 See ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 25 ("So long as public 
opinion sustains the Presi-
dent, as a sufficient amount of it sustained Lincoln 
in his shadowy tilt with Taney and
throughout the rest of the war, he has nothing 
to fear from the displeasure of the
courts."). Lincoln was an exceptionally able and resolute 
leader who was passionately
committed to preserving the Union, and he 
received the solid backing of Congress.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that in 1860 he 
received only 40% of the popular vote
(59% of the Electoral College), that his popularity waxed 
and waned along with the
Union's fortunes during the Civil War, and 
that his reelection was in doubt. See
FARBER, Supra note 85, at 20, 145-46. Nonetheless, 
in 1864 he was reelected with 55%
of the popular vote (and an overwhelming 91% of the 
electoral vote). See David
Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/
[hereinafter David Leip's Atlas] (select "General by Year," 
then follow 1864) (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2007). My central point is not that Lincoln 
was always personally popu-
lar, but rather that he was a strong leader 
with political savvy who displayed a
willingness to defy Chief Justice Taney over 
both habeas corpus and slavery.
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became President and pursued Lincoln's conciliatory 
plan to recon-
struct the South, he encountered bitter opposition from 
the Radical
Republicans who controlled Congress and who eventually 
impeached
him.11 6 In this political climate, the Justices understandably 
showed
more willingness to confront President Johnson 
than Congress.
For instance, in Ex parte MUlligan,
117 the Court granted a writ of
habeas corpus to an Indiana citizen who had 
been found guilty of
conspiracy against the federal government and 
sentenced to death by
a military commission
. 18 The Court concluded that Milligan had a
constitutional right to a regular jury trial because he had never 
served
in the armed forces and because the civil courts 
in Indiana had always
remained open1 19: "[Neither] the President, [nior any 
commander
under him, without the sanction of Congress, 
[can] institute tribunals
for the trial and punishment of offenses, either of soldiers 
or civilians,
unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which 
justifies what it com-
pels."12 0 The Court proclaimed that "the Constitution 
... is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, 
and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all
circumstanceS."121 This lofty rhetoric, however, 
conflicted with the
following frank admission:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of 
the times did not
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so 
necessary to a
correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then, consider-
ations of safety were mingled with the exercise of 
power; and feel-
ings and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. 
Now that
the public safety is assured, this question, as well 
as others, can be
discussed and decided without passion or the admixture 
of any ele-
ment not required to form a legal judgment.
122
116 The classic study is MICHAEL LES BENEDtCr, 
THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON 1-5, 89-95 (1973).
117 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
118 Id. at 107-08, 118-27.
119 Id. at 120-21, 127.
120 Id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
121 Id. at 120-21 (majority opinion). Four Justices avoided 
the constitutional
questions and instead concluded that the use 
of a military commission in Milligan's
case exceeded the authority granted to the President 
by Congress. See id. at 132-42
(Chase, C.J., concurring).
122 Id. at 109 (majority opinion). See RossITER, supra note 
84, at 30-39 (asserting
that the Court's "lecture" in Milligan, issued 
after Lincoln had died and the emer-
gency had passed, cannot be squared with its 
capitulation to all of the President's
actions during the Civil War-including the 
creation of military commissions-and
has had no impact on future Presidents); id. at 39 
("IT]he law of the Constitution is
what Lincoln did in the crisis, and not what 
the Court said later.").
1034 ThA ... . A..... ..
Moreover, the Court did not apply this same logic 
in two cases
challenging the constitutionality of the Reconstruction 
Acts (passed
over Johnson's veto), which established military governments 
in each
Southern state.' 23 First, in Georgia v. Stanton,'
2 4 the Court invoked the
political question doctrine to refuse to hear a claim 
that enforcement
of martial law in Georgia would unconstitutionally 
abolish the existing
state government.' 25 Second, Ex parte McCardle
126 upheld Congress's
power to repeal the Court's appellate jurisdiction in a pending 
case
brought by a petitioner who had been imprisoned 
for libeling Missis-
sippi's military government and who sought to 
void the Reconstruc-
tion Acts.
1 27
Overall, during the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
the rigor of
judicial review seemed to depend more on political than 
legal consid-
erations. For example, the Court deferred 
to Lincoln in The Prize
Cases and to Congress in Stanton and McCardle, 
perhaps because it
feared that any judgment invalidating their actions would 
have been
ignored. Conversely, the Court's brief shining 
moment in Milligan
may have reflected the political vulnerability 
of the Johnson Adminis-
tration as much as a desire to vindicate individual 
constitutional rights
through the hallowed writ of habeas corpus.
C. Two World Wars and Presidential Ascendancy
Twentieth-century Presidents followed the 
path blazed by
Lincoln. For example, to meet the challenges 
of World War I, Wood-
row Wilson persuaded Congress to enact sweeping 
legislation institut-
ing a draft, mobilizing domestic resources 
for the war effort, and
effectively suspending the First Amendment.
28 The Court played
along. Most notoriously, it sustained federal 
laws banning both "sedi-
tion" (i.e., disloyal or abusive language about federal 
officials or the
military) and "espionage" (including obstruction of military 
recruit-
123 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 
Stat. 428.
124 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
125 Id. at 76-77; see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 497-501
(1866) (declining to determine the constitutional validity 
of congressional acts or of
PresidentJohnson's exercise of discretion, pursuant 
to those statutes, to use appropri-
ate force in Southern military districts).
126 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
127 Id. at 508-09, 512-15; see Issacharoff & Pildes, 
supra note 20, at 15-17 (arguing
that the Court in McCardle properly adopted 
an "institutional process" method
focused on congressional policy choices and 
rejected the "constitutional rights"
approach of Milligan).
128 See ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 94-96 (describing 
the relevant statutes and the
Court's decisions upholding them).
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ment or enlistment and attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
or refusal of duty) on the ground that the government's interest in
winning the war outweighed the free speech rights of those who criti-
cized the war (e.g., by encouraging draft resistance).1 29 In other
cases, the Court held the conduct of foreign relations to be a political
question. 130
Similarly, the Justices capitulated to Franklin Roosevelt's exercise
of extraordinarily broad authority over military and foreign affairs.
Even before World War II, the Court declared in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.131 that "the very delicate, plenary, and exclu-
sive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations" did not require express
constitutional or legislative authorization. 132 Although Curtiss-Wright
itself involved military orders by Roosevelt that had been approved by
Congress,133 many of his other pre-war actions had not.134
129 The seminal case is Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge by leafletters who had been convicted under
the Espionage Act for obstructing military recruitment and encouraging insubordina-
tion); see also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 416 (1921) (validating a provision of the Espionage Act that the Post-
master General invoked to revoke the mailing privileges of an antiwar newspaper);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (sustaining the conviction of
Eugene Debs under the Espionage and Sedition Acts for criticizing the government's
intervention in the war and preventing recruiting). The Court acknowledged that
such laws, if they had been applied during peacetime, might well have run afoul of
free speech guarantees. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; see also MAY, supra note 37, at
1-2, 13-16, 191-253 (contending that the federal government's abusive assertion of
.war powers" during World War I and its aftermath led the Court to reassess, and
ultimately abandon, its practice of refusing to review the constitutionality of such
legislation).
130 See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-04 (1918) (deeming nonjus-
ticiable the government's recognition of the proper sovereign in a foreign country).
131 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
132 Id. at 320.
133 Id. at 312-13, 333 (upholding Roosevelt's proclamation directing military
officers to prevent violation of an arms embargo with certain South American coun-
tries, which had been issued pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress granting him
discretion over this matter).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (sustaining the
validity of the President's establishment of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and
the Soviet Union); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
110-13 (1973) (noting that, before Congress declared war in 1941, Roosevelt had
sent American troops to the North Atlantic, declared a state of "unlimited national
emergency," and ordered the Navy to shoot Nazi U-boats on sight).
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During World War II, the Court accepted the government's
claims that national security justified the suppression of individual
rights and liberties. Two cases are especially illuminating.
First, in Ex parte Quirin,15 the Justices construed an ambiguous
statute as authorizing the President to use his own military tribunals to
try "enemy combatants" for violating the laws of war, thereby avoiding
the need to address Roosevelt's assertion that he had independent
constitutional power to do so.13 6 The Court sustained a tribunal's
death sentences imposed on avowed Nazi saboteurs (including one
American citizen) who had surreptitiously entered the United States,
despite their argument in a habeas corpus petition that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments guaranteed their right to a trial in a civil court
with full constitutional protections-not procedures fashioned by the
President. 13 7 The Justices did not mention that Roosevelt had indi-
cated his intent to execute these saboteurs regardless of any contrary
judicial order. 38 The Court reaffirmed the validity of military com-
missions in other cases, most notably In re Yamashita.139
135 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
136 Id. at 21-30, 38-39, 45-48. The relevant Act of Congress stated that its provi-
sions describing courts martial "shall not be construed as depriving military commis-
sions ... of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." Id. at 27 (citing
Arts. 12, 15, 38, 46, 81, 82 of the Articles of War (recodified by Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1950))). The Court
read this language as a congressional grant of power to the President. Id. at 27-28.
However, this statute could also have been read (and likely was intended) as recogniz-
ing the President's independent authority to use military commissions when allowed
by the law of war. SeeWuerth, supra note 82, at 1574 n.55. The Court's clever inter-
pretation provided a convenient way for it to uphold FDR's actions in a situation
where attempting to thwart him would have proved futile. See infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
137 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22-48.
138 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson
and theJapanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 Sut,. CTr. REv. 455, 489-90; see also Katyal & Tribe,
supra note 8, at 1291 ("[Slome highly questionable ex parte arm-twisting by the exec-
utive may have spurred the Supreme Court's unanimous decision."). The public over-
whelmingly supported the trial of the saboteurs by military commission, expressed
outrage at the Court's decision to intervene, and applauded its snap judgment (issued
the day after oral argument) allowing the tribunal to proceed. See Goldsmith &
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 266-67. The Court issued an explanatory opinion months
later, after the executions had been carried out. See Neal Katyal, The Changing Laws of
War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After September II? Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79
NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 1237, 1252-53 (2004).
139 327 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1946). In that case, a military commission used special
procedural and evidentiary rules that deviated from ordinary court-martial practice,
and it convicted and sentenced to death ajapanese general for war crimes (failing to
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Second, in Korematsu v. United States,'40 the Court ruled that the
executive branch's determination (endorsed by Congress) that Japa-
nese-Americans on the West Coast had to be excluded from coastal
areas to prevent espionage and sabotage on behalf ofJapan warranted
the infringement of their due process and equal protection rights. 14 1
Recognizing that, absent such a dire emergency, the compulsory evac-
uation of large groups of citizens from their homes would have vio-
lated the Constitution, the Court stated:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we
are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly consti-
tuted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they
decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily .... [T]he need for action was great, and time was
short. [The judiciary] cannot-by availing (itself] of the calm per-
spective of hindsight-now say that at that time these actions were
unjustified. 142
prevent his troops from committing atrocities in the Philippines). Id. at 5-6. The
Court tpheld the denial of General Yamashita's habeas petition on the ground that
he did not enjoy the protection of Article 38 of the laws of war or the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1929. Id. at 7-24. The majority refused to second-guess the President's deter-
mination that this military commission was necessary (even though it had been
convened after the war had ended) or his choice of procedural rules. Id. at 12-13,
18-23; see also Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) (per curiam) (denying
habeas relief to Nazis who had been convicted by a U.S. military tribunal at Nurem-
berg). Quiin, Yamashita, and many other cases illustrate that "it]he Supreme Court
of the United States cannot be expected, indeed has no right, to set itself up as a sort
of supermilitary commission to oversee the worldwide activities of the punitive tribu-
nals that the President has authorized." ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 118-19.
140 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
141 Id. at 215-25. General Dewitt issued this specific exclusion order pursuant to
Roosevelt's more general Executive Order, which in turn had been ratified by
Congress. Id, at 215-17.
142 Id. at 223-24. Similarly, the Court sustained the conviction of an American
citizen of Japanese descent for violating a curfew order issued at the executive's dis-
cretion under a broad congressional delegation of power. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-94 (1943). According to the Court:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality .... We may assume that these considerations would be
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and
sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military
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In dissent, Justice Jackson suggested that judges lacked sufficient
information to intelligently examine executive claims of military
necessity. 143 He then argued that the Court, having asserted jurisdic-
tion, had a duty to strike down this exclusion order because it clearly
violated the constitutional rights- of citizens of Japanese descent.144
The Court did, however, allow an individual to challenge her
detention after the forced transfer had taken place. Mitsuye Endo
filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the government, through its
War Relocation Authority (WRA), had violated her due process right
to liberty by detaining her without charges and without disputing her
claim of patriotism.1 45 The Court avoided this constitutional question
by holding that Congress had not authorized such imprisonment:
Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed, or
color. He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur.
When the power to detain is derived from the [statutory] power to
protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention
which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.' 46
Nonetheless, Endo hardly represents a courageous rebuke to gov-
ernment overreaching, for two reasons. First, Congress had approved
and funded the relocation prison camps with Roosevelt's support, and
the Court's absurd statutory interpretation to the contrary absolved
Congress and the President of responsibility for violating the constitu-
tional rights of Japanese-Americans by shifting blame to a lowly
authorities to scntinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of popula-
tions in the danger areas.
Id. at 100.
143 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Particularly astute is his
observation that the "chief restraint" on the President and his military commanders is
.their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the
moral judgments of history." Id. at 248.
144 Id. at 246-48. He made the crucial point that the Court's validation of the
government's discrimination, by establishing a constitutional principle that could be
invoked to justify similar repression in the future, was far worse than the military
order itself, which was temporary. Id. at 245-46. Two otherJustices contended that
the Court had abdicated its responsibility to enforce the Constitution by allowing such
unjustified discrimination. See id. at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233-42
(Murphy, J., dissenting). For an excellent analysis of the Japanese relocation policy
and cases, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
145 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-302 (1944).
146 Id. at 302; see also id. at 297, 300-04 (construing the statute). See Sunstein,
supra note 22, at 83-85, 90-93 (arguing that the Court during World War If declined
to decide the extent of the President's constitutional war powers, but rather upheld
the President when he acted pursuant to congressional authorization (Korematsu and
Hirabayashi) and" rebuffed him when he did not (Endo)).
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agency, the WRA. 47 Second, the Justices delayed deciding the case
until the day after Roosevelt announced he would end the
internment. 1 4
8
Overall, the Court deferred to Roosevelt's Lincolnesque assertion
of remarkably broad power to win a war that threatened the existence
of the United States and all other democracies. The majority of Jus-
tices correctly realized that, in such dire circumstances, they could do
little to thwart our longest-serving President, who enjoyed immense
popular and congressional support and who had no compunction
about challenging the Court.149 Cases like Quiin and Korematsu are
sobering reminders of the limits on judicial review in wartime.
It is worth noting, however, that the year after FDR died and
World War II ended, the Court declined to extend Quiin. Rather, in
147 See Kang, supra note 9, at 260-61, 268-75. Endo vividly demonstrates the
naivet6 of assuming that the Court engages in an impartial effort to ascertain whether
or not Congress authorized a particular wartime action. See supra notes 23-25, 28 and
accompanying text.
148 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 84 n.167 (making this point, but noting that
some historians have debated the timing issue); see also RoSSITER, supra note 84, at 47
(emphasizing that the Court decided Endo only after the military area had been dises-
tablished and the relocation camps were being broken up). In another example of
convenient timing, Roosevelt successfully seized over sixty plants where labor disputes
had impeded the war effort, but the Court waited until the end of the war to consider
a legal challenge to these seizures. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States, 326
U.S. 690 (1945) (directing the lower court to dismiss the case as moot because the
government had returned the disputed property); see also RossITER, supra note 84, at
59-63 (describing the Court's response to FDR's seizures).
149 The lone President to serve more than two terms, Roosevelt was elected four
times with resounding majorities. See David Leip's Atlas, supra note 115, at
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (select "General by Year," then follow 1932,
1936, 1940, and 1944). In 1935, when the Justices considered his decision to take the
United States off the gold standard, he was "in the event of an unfavorable ruling,
prepared to defy the Court and precipitate a constitutional crisis." See William E.
Leuchtenberg, Charles Hughes: The Center Holds, 83 N.C. L. R~v. 1187, 1191 (2005).
When the Court in 1935-1936 invalidated several.critical New Deal statutes, Roosevelt
famously proposed to appoint six new Justices to overrule such decisions. Moreover,
FDR chose as his appointees not independent-minded jurists, but rather political pro-
fessionals sympathetic to his policies. See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as
Political Spoils, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 525, 525 (2005). These Justices almost certainly
understood that Roosevelt was unlikely to alter his war policies because of an adverse
Court holding. As his Attorney General famously remarked, Roosevelt illustrated that
"[t] he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President." FRANcis BIDDLE,
IN BRIEF AUTHOpIT 219 (1962); see Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 278
(describing the popularity of, and respect commanded by, Roosevelt and Biddle); see
also CORWIN, supra note 53, at 287 (stressing that FDR, like Lincoln, asserted power to
effectively suspend the Constitution if he determined that doing so was necessary to
win a war).
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Duncan v. Kahanamoku,'50 it held that a federal statute imposing mar-
tial law in Hawaii, which did not mention military commissions,
should be read as prohibiting the executive from using such commis-
sions where the civil courts remained open and loyal civilian citizens
had been charged with garden-variety crimes that had no impact on
national security.' 5 ' Thus, as in Milligan, the Court attempted to sal-
vage some restraints on the government's exercise of war powers after
the immediate crisis had passed.' 52
D. The Cold War and the Modern Era
After World War 11, the Court sent out mixed signals about its
willingness to engage in serious judicial review of presidential actions
in military and foreign affairs. On the one hand, it declared in 1948
that
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is politi-
cal, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Consti-
tution to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large ele-
ments of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry.' 53
150 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
151 Id. at 315-23. The Court emphasized that this case involved loyal citizens, and
thus it did not question military jurisdiction over enemy belligerents in cases like
Quiin. Id. at 313, 319. The Court also conceded that the federal organic act gov-
erning Hawaii did not clearly address military commissions, but declared that it would
resolve this ambiguity in favor of preserving judicial procedures. Id. at 319-23. Once
again, the Justices did not interpret a statute to glean Congress's intent (which was
indeterminate), but rather simply implemented extra-statutory principles.
152 See Scheindlin & Schwartz, supra note 84, at 839-40 (pointing out that, as the
exigencies of World War 11 decreased, the Court reasserted its role in cases like Endo
and Kahanamoku); see also Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2572, 2576 (contending that
such decisions serve a valuable function by creating some legal constraints on the
government in responding to future emergencies). Whether such limits have teeth is
debatable; Milligan had little effect on Presidents' conduct of later wars, especially
World War II. See RossriER, supra note 84, at 52-59, 127-29 (concluding that the
Court imposes restrictions after the emergency has passed, thereby making them
more theoretical than practical in the context of fighting an actual war).
153 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948);
see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495 (1951) (upholding the Smith Act,
which effectively made it a crime to be a member of (or support) the Communist
Party).
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Two key cases involving military tribunals illustrated 
this deferential
approach.
First in ohnson v. Eisentrager,15 4 the Court held that nonresident
enemy aliens who had been captured in China, 
convicted there of war
crimes by a United States military commission, 
and transferred to an
American military prison in Germany had no 
right to federal judicial
access: 
5 5 
"Executive power over enemy aliens, 
undelayed and
unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, 
throughout our history,
essential to war-time security."'
5 6 Allowing federal courts to extend
the writ of habeas corpus beyond their territorial 
jurisdiction would
hinder the war effort and aid our enemies 
by imposing large risks and
costs (especially in transporting and caring for prisoners 
and their wit-
nesses), undermining the authority of commanding 
officers and
diverting their attention, and generating 
friction between federal
judges and the military. 157 Accordingly, the Court refused 
to reexam-
ine the proceedings of the military commission-an 
institution with
well-established authority to punish offenses 
against the law of war.'
58
Second, Madsen v. Kinsella
159 affirmed a military tribunal's juris-
diction to try a civilian United States citizen 
for murdering her hus-
band, a lieutenant serving in the American-occupied 
area of
Germany.160 The Court emphasized that 
Congress had long acknowl-
edged the President's power as Commander 
in Chief to establish mili-
tary commissions as part of his "urgent and 
infinite responsibility ...
of combating the enemy"'
6 1:
Since our nation's earliest days, such commissions 
have been consti-
tutionally recognized agencies for meeting 
many urgent govern-
ment responsibilities related to war .... Neither 
their procedure
154 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
155 Id. at 767-77.
156 Id. at 774; see also id. at 776-77 (citing the Court's 
adherence to this rule from
the early days of the Republic). By contrast, a resident 
alien could obtain limited
judicial review to determine whether a state of war existed 
and whether he was, in
fact, an enemy alien. d. at 775-76, 784.
157 Id. at 777-79. The Court distinguished 
Quiin as involving saboteurs who had
been captured and tried within the United States 
for actions occurring there. d. at
779-80. Similarly, the prisoners in Yamashita had 
committed offenses and been jailed
and tried within American-controlled territory. 
Id. at 780-81.
158 Id. at 786-87.
159 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
160 Id. at 342-62.
161 Id. at 348.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been
adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth.'1 2
On the other hand, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
1 63
the Court rejected President Truman's claim that Article II implicitly
authorized him to order the seizure and operation of American steel
mills to avert a nationwide strike that threatened steel production vital
to the Korean War effort.' 64 The majority held that Truman had
usurped Congress's power to make laws in the domestic policy arena
because the Labor Management Relations Act did not authorize the
executive to seize property to settle labor disputes. 1 65 Nor did the
President have power to take this action as Commander in Chief, as
would have been true if he had been directing the armed forces in the
foreign theater of war.1
6 6
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson argued that the Consti-
tution's text, history, and precedent did not reveal any "useful and
unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power," but rather provided "quotations from respected sources on
each side of any question . . . [that] largely cancel each other."1 6 7
Accordingly, he urged a flexible, pragmatic approach recognizing that
"Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."1 6 Jackson
identified three main categories. First, where Congress authorizes the
President's action, a very strong presumption of constitutionality
arises, rebuttable only on a showing that the federal government as a
162 Id. at 346-48. The Court concluded that Congress, in Article of War 15, had
extensively regulated courts-martial but had preserved the existing jurisdiction of
executive branch military commissions over common-law war crimes, consistent with
historical practice and with precedent like Quirin and Yamashita. Id. at 347-55; cf
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (ruling that a civilian living in America could not
constitutionally be tried by court martial for murder allegedly committed when he
was in the Air Force); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-15 (1957) (holding that an Ameri-
can citizen who had been convicted of murdering her husband, a U.S. military officer
stationed outside of an occupied war zone (England), had been denied her constitu-
tional right to ajury trial); United States v. Verdugo, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (limit-
ing Reid's application to American citizens, not aliens).
163 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
164 See id. at 582-89.
165 See id. at 585-86 (supporting this conclusion by pointing out that Congress had
rejected an amendment that would have empowered governmental seizures of prop-
erty in cases of emergency). Because Congress had not authorized the President's
actions, he could not claim to be merely exercising his Article II power to execute the
law. Id. at 587-88.
166 See id. at 587.
167 See id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 635.
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whole lacks power.1 69 Second, where statutes are silent, "a zone of
twilight [exists] in which [the President] and Congress may have con-
current authority, or in which distribution is uncertain," and in such
cases "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law."1 70 Third,
[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Presiden-
tial claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium estab-
lished by our constitutional system. 17 1
Justice Jackson concluded that the seizure of the steel mills fell into
this third category.1 72 He rejected Truman's argument that the exec-
utive had virtually unlimited inherent authority as Commander in
Chief to meet emergencies such as war, but rather interpreted the
Constitution as enabling Congress to expand the President's powers
as it deems necessary to deal with such threats. 173 Yet Jackson
acknowledged that Congress had to exercise such power or would lose
it. 174
Chief Justice Vinson and two colleagues dissented on the ground
that various statutes did authorize the President's action' 75 and that,
in any event, Truman had independent Article II power to take steps
he thought necessary to win the Korean War. 176 This dissent again
demonstrates that the question of legal authorization for the exercise
of war powers is often contestable.
In brief, the majority apparently felt that the Korean War posed a
far less critical threat than World War I, that Truman had proceeded
169 Id. at 635-37.
170 Id. at 637.
171 Id. at 637-38.
172 Id. at 640.
173 Id. at 640-55.
174 Id. at 654.
175 Congress had given the President vast power to prosecute the war in Korea and
had instituted wage and price controls to ensure production of key commodities like
steel. Id. at 668-72 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice contended that (1)
Truman had a duty to execute these laws and to determine how they could best be
harmonized with the Labor Management Relations Act, and (2) no federal statutory
provision prohibited taking property as necessary to vindicate Congress's wartime
policies. Id. at 672-79, 701-10.
176 Id. at 680-700 (setting forth a detailed history of presidential actions during
wartime, including seizures of property).
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without any clear congressional approval, that he had overstepped his
constitutional bounds, and that fundamental Fifth Amendment rights
were at stake. None of the Justices mentioned that in 1952 Truman
lacked the popularity and political capital to resist the Court's
judgment. 7 7
The Court eventually adopted Justice Jackson's analytical
model. 1 7  Nonetheless, it has applied this framework with varying
degrees of rigor, often to reach results that are at odds with Jackson's
views. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,179 the Court sustained
President Carter's order suspending private claims in American courts
against Iran, even though no statute had expressly authorized this
suspension, on the ground that Congress had done so implicitly by
acquiescing to similar executive acts in the past.180 Indeed, in almost
177 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a KindP, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 63, 64-75 (2002) (concluding that the Court reflected the tide of public
opinion, which had turned decisively against Truman because he had asserted unlim-
ited executive power to fight a war that most Americans no longer supported).
Youngstown was "the backlash to the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular
President, to invoke national security as the justification for seizing steel mills during
a labor dispute in 1952, an election year in which control of the White House subse-
quently shifted from one party to the other." J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience:
The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 CoNsr. COMMENT. 37, 42 (2002). Sidak
argues that Justice Jackson's eloquent statement of liberty-based limits on presidential
prerogatives has been supplanted by the experience of 9/11, which demonstrated the
truly compelling nature of the government's interest in defending its citizens. Id. at
37-42, 53-61.
178 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). The Court
has struck down a few measures justified as exercises of war powers, albeit not involv-
ing presidential military decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262
(1967) (declaring unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting Communists from work-
ing in defense plants); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-67 (1963)
(invalidating a statute taking away the citizenship of anyone who had evaded service
in World War 11 or the Korean War).
179 453 U.S. 654.
180 Id. at 656, 669-88; see KoH, supra note 11, at 139-40 (maintaining that the
Court "inverted the Steel Seizure holding" by suggesting that " [i]n responding to per-
ceived national crises, the president should act first, then search for preexisting con-
gressional blank checks, rather than seek specific prior approval of controversial
decisions"). But see Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 91-93 (2002) (claiming that Youngstown's significance is more
symbolic than doctrinal, as it provides few concrete legal guidelines to resolve dis-
putes, particularly concerning whether the President has acted in accordance with
Congress's implied will); id. at 93-95, 125-54 (criticizing the Court's tendency to
avoid constitutional questions through dubious statutory interpretations and recom-
mending that it assess Congress's authorization of executive conduct by applying ordi-
nary delegation principles and, if it finds authorization lacking, resolving issues about
the scope of the President's constitutional powers).
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every major case after Youngstown, the judiciary has deferred to the
executive in military and foreign affairs. 81 For instance, federal
courts consistently rejected constitutional challenges to the
undeclared wars in Vietnam, 182 Nicaragua, 183 and the Persian Gulf.18 4
Thus, there is little support for the notion that the judiciary has gradu-
ally become more vigorous in exercising judicial review over military
decisions.-1
181 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (accepting the President's
decision continuing the embargo against Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 304-07
(1981) (sustaining the Secretary of State's revocation of the passport of a dangerous
former CIA agent and remarking that "it is 'obvious and unarguable' that no govern-
mental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation" (quoting
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))). See generally Mark E. Brandon,
War and the American Constitutional Order, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1815, 1856 (2003) (expres-
sing skepticism about scholars' pronouncements that cases like Youngstown have led
to the demise of the line of precedent epitomized by the Prize Cases and Korematsu).
182 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (2d Cir. 1973);
Sarnoffv. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. United States,
406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1969). Although most courts denied such claims on politi-
cal question grounds, some asserted limited power to determine whether Congress
had participated in the decision to wage war-for example, by passing resolutions and
making necessary appropriations. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Corn, supra note 26, at 218-31 (summarizing Vietnam War
cases). In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court held that military training
and procedures raised political questions, and hence dismissed a complaint alleging
that negligent training of the National Guard had led to the shooting of antiwar
protestors at Kent State. Id. at 6-9; see Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1167-78 (1970) (criti-
cizing the judiciary's refusal to review constitutional challenges to the Vietnam War).
The leading counterexample is New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (rejecting the Nixon Administration's claim that national security overrode a
newspaper's First Amendment right to publish the "Pentagon Papers," which
contained confidential and embarrassing information about America's involvement
in Vietnam).
183 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Rami-
rez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
184 See, e.g., Dellumsv. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141,1152 (D.D.C. 1990);Angev. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 509, 518 (D.D.C. 1990). This tradition continued when courts declined
to entertain challenges to President Clinton's military intervention in the former
Yugoslavia. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
185 See Devins 8c Fisher, supra note 177, at 75-84 (accusing the modern Court of
abdicating its duty to enforce the Constitution's written limits on the government,
reflecting the public's view that the President is the source of military power and the
failure of Congress, for political reasons, to assert its constitutional prerogatives).
Professor Cole has acknowledged that judges, in the midst of national security crises,
have been overly deferential and have rarely provided relief to victims of unconstitu-
tional conduct. See Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at 2565-66, 2568-71; Cole, Morality,
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E. Summary
The Court's precedent concerning presidential power during
wartime does not follow a linear progression yielding clear-cut rules.
Rather, the cases vary and are heavily fact-dependent. Generally, the
Court has deferred to the President, either treating his assertion of
authority as raising political questions (e.g., Mott, The Prize Cases, Val-
landigham, and Eisentrager) or upholding his actions after a lenient
review on the merits (e.g., Quifin and Korematsu).18s6 However, in
decisions like Milligan, Kahanamoku, and Youngstown, the Court has
checked the President and championed individual rights. The degree
of deference to the executive ebbs and flows based upon myriad (and
often highly subjective) factors, including (1) the seriousness and
urgency of the military crisis, and the importance of the specific presi-
dential measure in resolving it; (2) the presence or absence of con-
gressional endorsement for the executive's action; (3) the significance
of the individual legal rights at stake; and (4) the political strength of
the President and the likelihood he will obey the Court's judgment
supra note 8, at 1761-62. Nonetheless, he maintains that the eventual condemnation
of such bad decisions, and the Court's announcement of legal standards in wartime
cases (particularly those decided after the immediate crisis has passed), gradually
have limited the options the political branches can exercise in future emergencies
(e.g., today detention based solely on race would not be tolerated). See Cole, Judging,
supra note 8, at 2566, 2571-77; Cole, Morality, supra note 8, at 1762-63; cf Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu ? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 273, 283-307 (arguing that past instances of what society comes to see as unjusti-
fiable incursions on civil liberties progressively reduce the scope of such violations,
but that new threats generate novel policy responses that endanger constitutional
rights in different ways).
However, I share the skepticism of other scholars who do not view modern judges
as more willing than their predecessors to check the political branches' constitutional
excesses during wartime. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029, 1041-44 (2004); Tushnet, supra, at 305; see also Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 12, at 623-25 (dismissing as speculative the notion that government offi-
cials, including courts, will show greater restraint than in the past if grave circum-
stances akin to the Civil War and World War 11 were to arise); cf Ackerman, supra, at
1029-91 (rejecting the absolutist civil libertarian position as unrealistic after 9/11,
and instead proposing a legal regime in which we permit emergency presidential
actions that restrict liberty but only temporarily, through a requirement that Congress
reapprove such measures by ever-increasing majorities at stated intervals).
186 See ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 5-10, 90-92, 126-42 (contending that the Court
typically has adopted a realistic attitude during wartime by dismissing cases on juris-
dictional grounds or stretching the Constitution to validate government actions and
by trusting the people and Congress to check any abuses by the President).
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(considerations that are never articulated but that often seem
crucial) .187
In short, the results are unpredictable and appear to rest on an
ad hoc balancing of various legal and pragmatic elements. Thus, one
must be cautious in reading any single case (or group of cases decided
within a short period) as portending a major shift in doctrine. It is
against this background that the recent decisions involving the War
on Terrorism should be evaluated.
III. THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES
Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
empowered the President to employ "all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist attacks
[and] to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States."188 President Bush quickly dispatched armed forces to
Afghanistan and intensified efforts to combat domestic terrorism.
Most importantly, Bush asserted authority to indefinitely incarcer-
ate anyone he alone identified as an "enemy combatant" and, if he
chose, to try such prisoners by a military commission of his own crea-
tion. The Court has rebuffed both of these claims. A careful exami-
nation of these decisions, however, reveals that some commentators
187 See Brandon, supra note 181, at 1833 (maintaining that the Court's flexible
balancing approach permits "fine judgments about the nature of the military conflict,
the severity of the danger to the interests of state, and the character of the claimed
fight"); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2056 (recognizing that legal
doctrine relevant to interpreting congressional authorizations of force does not
always yield "determinate answers" because judicial decisions are influenced by con-
siderations such as perceptions of threat levels and risks to civil liberties); Powell,
supra note 12, at 528-29 (citing with approval Louis Henkin's observation that the
Court has developed few legal principles concerning presidential authority in foreign
affairs and instead resolves cases on an ad hoc basis); cf Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The
9/11 "National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges'Decision-Making, 81 OR. L.
REv. 985, 996-98 (2002) (arguing that judicial deference should be relaxed when the
President addresses domestic affairs rather than true war powers, exercises power that
the Constitution reserves to Congress, or allegedly violates the Bill of Rights); Margu-
lies, supra note 23, at 385-443 (contending that courts should adopt an "institutional
equity" approach by examining whether the government has shown that (1) its exi-
gent measures are justified because existing legal remedies are inadequate, and (2) its
need for flexibility in addressing a military threat outweighs the damage to the integ-
rity of legal institutions and the hardships imposed on members of disfavored minor-
ity groups).
188 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(Supp. III 2003)).
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have exaggerated the negative impact of these cases on President
Bush's policies and on executive power generally.
A. Cases Involving the Detention of Enemy Combatants
Enemy combatants have included a few American citizens, who
are protected by a 1971 statute providing that "[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursu-
ant to an Act of Congress." 8 9 Two citizens and one alien who had
been labeled "enemy combatants" by the Bush Administration
brought constitutional challenges. These three cases will be analyzed
in turn.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdi, an American citizen by birth who moved to Saudi Arabia
as a child, was captured in Afghanistan. 190 The United States asserted
that Hamdi had fought with the Taliban and detained him indefi-
nitely-without formal charges-at several military prisons (most
recently, one in South Carolina). 9 1 Hamdi's father filed a habeas
petition alleging that his son had gone to Afghanistan to do relief
work.1 92 All of the Justices except Thomas voted to strike down the
government's actions, albeit for different reasons.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, reached two major conclusions. First, Con-
gress's authorization to the President to use "all necessary and appro-
priate force" implicitly included the long-recognized war power of
imprisoning "enemy combatants" for the duration of the armed con-
flict, and under Quiin it did not matter that Hamdi was an American
citizen 1 93 Second, the Due Process Clause required balancing two
crucial interests.1 94 On the one hand, Hamdi had a fundamental
right to be free from incarceration without due process 95:
189 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
190 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
191 Id. at 511-12 (noting that this detention had been based solely upon an affida-
vit from a Defense Department official that Hamdi had been a Taliban fighter).
192 Id. at 511.
193 Id. at 516-23; see also id. at 519-21 (rejecting the administration's broader
claim that Hamdi could be detained indefinitely, not merely until the end of the war
in Afghanistan). Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the AUMF authorized
the imprisonment of enemy combatants. See id. at 587-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 529-32 (plurality opinion).
195 Id. at 530-31 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866)).
1048 [VOL. S2:3
2007] THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1049
[It] is . . .vital that ... [we] not give short shrift to the values that
this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizen-
ship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that
our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested;
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.1 96
On the other hand, the government had critical interests in (1)
ensuring that those who had actually fought for the enemy not return
to battle, and (2) avoiding a trial-like process, which would distract
military officers and lead to disclosure of military secrets.1 9 7 Accom-
modating these competing concerns, the Court "[held] that a citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combat-
ant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker."1 9 8
Justice O'Connor conceded that "the exigencies of the circum-
stances may demand that. .. enemy combatant proceedings be tai-
lored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict."1 99 For instance, ordinary rules
of evidence (e.g., the rule against hearsay) need not be observed. 2 °0
Indeed, even an impartial, "appropriately authorized" military tribu-
nal might meet the announced standards.20 1 The plurality asserted
that such limited procedures would have little or no impact on the
actual conduct of the war. 202
In short, the Court acknowledged the superior institutional com-
petence of politically accountable officials over military strategy and
operations20 3 and its special sensitivity to executive decisions in this
context.20 4 Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor declared that separation
of powers required the involvement of all three branches when mili-
tary actions invaded individual liberties:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judg-
ments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prose-
196 See id. at 532; see also id. at 539 (declaring that the Court must be sensitive both
to national security issues and to "the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns").
197 Id. at 531-32.
198 Id. at 533.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 533-34.
201 Id. at 538.
202 Id. at 534.
203 Id. at 531 (citing Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
204 Id. at 536.
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cution of a war, and recognize that the scope of discretion
necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the mili-
tary for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitu-
tionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those
presented here. 20 5
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that federal
courts had jurisdiction to examine Hamdi's due process claim, but
concluded that the AUMF did not provide the express, specific con-
gressional authorization for executive imprisonment of citizens
required by the 1971 federal statute. 20 6 Although Souter did not
reach the issue of what processes should be used, he disavowed the
plurality's suggestion that a military commission might suffice. 2 7
Justice Scalia, along with Justice Stevens, went much further.2 013
In their opinion, the Constitution allows the detention of an Ameri-
can citizen only pursuant to a criminal prosecution in federal court
with all attendant procedural rights, except in the rare instance when
Congress has suspended habeas corpus.20 9 Accordingly, the President
could not circumvent this clear constitutional design by asserting that
a military emergency required different procedures against citizens
accused of aiding the enemy.2 10 Justice Scalia characterized this ban
on indefinite wartime detention of citizens as part of the Framers'
more "general distrust of military power permanently at the Execu-
205 Id. at 535. Therefore, the Court declined to accept the government's argu-
ment that judicial review should be limited to determining either that (1) the Presi-
dent had legal authority for the detention scheme, or (2) there was "some evidence"
for the individual imprisonment-a standard that could be satisfied by the executive
alone providing supporting facts. Id. at 526-27, 535-36.
206 Id. at 540-50 (Souter,J., concurring). They conceded, however, that the Presi-
dent might have power in "a moment of genuine emergency" to detain citizens if he
reasonably feared they might be an imminent threat to the nation. Id. at 552. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2103-06 (maintaining that Justice Souter
erred in insisting on a "clear statement" in the AUMF that citizens who were enemy
combatants could be detained, because this interpretive canon properly applied only
to protect the liberty of citizens who were noncombatants).
207 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553.
208 Id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 554-57, 564-79. Justice Scalia invoked Milligan as properly rejecting the
government's attempt to hold and convict a citizen through military processes rather
than a criminal trial in a civil court. Id. at 566-69 (citing ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866)). He then argued that Quirin had misinterpreted Milligan.
Id. at 569-73 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942)); see also id. at 573 (distin-
guishing Quiin on the ground that the petitioners there-including an American
citizen-had conceded they were members of enemy armed forces).
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tive's disposal." '11 He observed that, because the Constitution man-
dated ordinary criminal procedures for citizens, the plurality had no
authority to suggest new processes such as dispensing with the rules of
evidence or allowing decision by a neutral military tribunal.21 2
Finally, Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that judicial
review should be narrowly confined to ascertaining whether the law
authorized the President to hold enemy combatants, and he found
that both Article II and the AUMF conferred such power.21 3 He con-
tended that the plurality had erred in asking the further question of
whether Hamdi actually was an enemy combatant-a factual judg-
ment entrusted solely to the President.214 In Justice Thomas's view,
courts lacked the expertise and relevant information to second-guess
the President's decision, which involved delicate and complex policy
calibrations. 215 Moreover, he concluded that due process required
only that the President determine in good faith that detention was
211 Id. at 568.
212 Id. at 575-77. Justice Scalia closed by denying the applicability of the maxim
inter arma silent leges to a Constitution designed to confront and accommodate war.
Id. at 579.
Scalia's argument has received detailed support from Carlton Larson, who makes
four major points. First, Article IlI's Treason Clause incorporated the centuries-old
English understanding that anyone who owed allegiance to a nation (either citizens
or those living temporarily and openly in the country) and breached that allegiance
would be subject to trial in an ordinary court. See Larson, supra note 63, at 867-83.
Second, American courts faithfully adhered to this understanding for a century and a
half. Id. at 867-68, 884-94. Third, the Court dramatically deviated from this tradi-
tion in Quirin by allowing military jurisdiction over alleged traitors, and repeated this
mistake in Hamdi. Id. at 868, 894-99. Fourth, most terrorists who enter the United
States are engaged in treason because they are either "levying war" against it (i.e.,
using group force to usurp the federal government's functions or alter its policies) or
aiding their "enemies" (i.e., foreigners with no allegiance to America engaged in hos-
tilities against it). Id. at 899-914; see also id. at 920-23 (contending that courts can
review the political branches' designation of someone as an "enemy," but must show
substantial deference). Ultimately, Professor Larson concludes that terrorists are not
engaged in activities so militaristic and horrific as to justify an exception that would
commit them to military jurisdiction. M. at 900, 923-26.
Although Larson's historical research is impressive, courts cannot ignore techno-
logical changes-such as the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weap-
ons as well as computerized communications-that make individual or small groups
of terrorists able to inflict infinitely more destruction than the Founders could have
imagined. Likewise, the September 11 attacks revealed the shortcomings of the previ-
ous executive approach of treating terrorists like ordinary criminals and giving them
trials in federal courts.
213 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214 See id. at 584-86.
215 See id. at 579-86.
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necessary to protect the public,
21 6 and hence rejected the plurality's
crafting of a balancing test.
21 7
2. Rasul v. Bush
The federal habeas corpus statute authorizes 
district courts,
"within their respective jurisdictions," to hear petitions by anyone
claiming to be imprisoned in violation of the federal 
Constitution,
laws, or treaties.21 8 In Rasul v. Bush,
219 the Court interpreted this pro-
vision to include challenges by aliens captured abroad 
and detained at
the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, which 
by treaty is under
America's exclusive jurisdiction and control, but subject to Cuba's
,ultimate sovereignty."220
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens recognized that Johnson v.
Eisentrager221 had held that federal courts lacked 
constitutional habeas
corpus jurisdiction over aliens who had been convicted of war 
crimes
by a military commission overseas and 
incarcerated in Germany.
222
The Court distinguished Eisentrager on the grounds 
that the petition-
ers in Rasul were not nationals of countries at 
war with the United
States, had denied committing acts of aggression 
against America, had
never been given access to any tribunal, and had 
been imprisoned in a
territory over which the U.S. had complete jurisdiction.
223 Justice Ste-
vens further noted that the opinion in Eisentrager 
had focused on the
constitutional (not statutory) right to habeas, except for 
"a passing
reference to the absence of statutory authorization."
224 The Court
216 See id. at 589-91 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S: (7 How.) 
1, 43-45 (1849),
and other cases). justice Thomas distinguished Milligan and 
similar decisions on the
ground that they involved criminal proceedings, 
whereas Hamdi had been detained
not as a punishment but rather as a safety precaution. 
See id. at 592-93.
217 See id. at 594-98 (arguing that the plurality failed to 
account for the govern-
ment's interests in holding enemy combatants as 
a crucial part of conducting war,
using detention to gather critical intelligence, avoiding 
the involvement of military
officials in litigation, and preventing the disclosure 
of confidential information).
218 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c) (3) (2000).
219 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
220 See id. at 470-85 (quoting Lease of Land for Coaling 
and Naval Stations, art.
III., U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. no. 418).
221 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
222 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
223 Id.; see also id. at 486-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with these distinc-
tions, and stressing that in Eisentrager federal judicial interference 
would have had a
harmful effect on the political branches' conduct 
of military affairs by reopening the
case of enemy prisoners who had been duly tried, 
convicted, and sentenced by mili-
tary commissions in a war zone far outside the United 
States' territorial jurisdiction).
224 Id. at 476 (majority opinion). The Court also concluded that 
Eisentragers terse
rejection of jurisdiction under the habeas statute had been implicitly 
overruled in
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limited its ruling as follows: "[F]ederal courts have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite deten-
tion of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of
wrongdoing."2 25
In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas) argued that Eisentrager had correctly interpreted the
habeas statute as not extending to aliens kept in military prisons
outside the United States' borders and beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of all federal courts. 22 6 Justice Scalia reiterated the Eisentrager
Court's warning that judicial interference might produce dire conse-
quences for the military in terms of risk, cost, hampering the war
effort, aiding our enemies, diverting commanders' attention, and
sparking disputes between judges and the military.22 7 Justice Scalia
decried the majority's holding that federal courts have habeas jurisdic-
tion whenever they can reach a "custodian" (as contrasted with the
prisoner himself) as a "breathtaking" assertion ofjurisdiction through-
out the world.22
3. Rumsfeld v, Padilla
Padilla, an American citizen, was apprehended pursuant to a war-
rant issued by a U.S. District Court in New York in connection with a
grand jury investigation into September 1 1 .229 While Padilla's motion
to vacate this warrant was pending, President Bush designated him an
"enemy combatant" and ordered Secretary of Defense Donald
Braden v. 30thJudicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), which permitted a federal
district court to review a petition filed by a prisoner outside its territorial jurisdiction
(he was being held by another district court) so long as its process could reach his
custodian. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95). Justice
Kennedy disputed the idea that Braden had overturned Eisentrager, and instead found
that the district court had jurisdiction under the Eisentrager framework. See id. at
485-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens expressed no opin-
ion about what proceedings would be necessary. Id.
226 See id. at 488-506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 499 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950)). He
pointed out that Braden applied not to foreigners outside of America, but rather to
citizens in custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States who wished to
challenge the legality of their confinement. See id. at 493-97.
228 Id. at 498. "For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war,
and in frustration of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law,
is judicial adventurism of the worst sort." Id. at 506. Justice Scalia also emphasized
that the Court's focus on the location of the custodians (not the prisoners) made
irrelevant its elaborate treatment of the status of Guantanamo Bay, where the prison-
ers had been detained. Id. at 500.
229 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004).
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Rumsfeld to detain him.
230 Rumsfeld moved Padilla to a Navy brig in
South Carolina commanded by Melanie Marr.
231 Padilla then filed a
habeas petition in the New York federal court and 
named Rumsfeld
and Marr as respondent.
232
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the New 
York district
court lacked jurisdiction. 233 The Court concluded that Marr was 
the
only proper respondent because she, unlike Rumsfeld, 
was Padilla's
immediate custodian in his core habeas challenge 
to his present physi-
cal confinement. 234 Accordingly, only the federal 
district court in
South Carolina, where Marr lived, would have 
jurisdiction. 23 5 In dis-
sent, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer reasoned that, to
protect the purpose of the habeas writ, the Court 
should have recog-
nized Rumsfeld as a proper respondent because 
he had been person-
ally involved in the decision to transfer 
Padilla to South Carolina.
23 6
4. A Critical Analysis of the "Enemy Combatant" 
Detention Cases
Most commentators hailed the Supreme Court 
for upholding
fundamental constitutional liberties and reining 
in the excesses of the
Bush Administration. 23
7 They are certainly correct that the majority
of Justices, seeking to preserve basic due process 
values, interpreted
the habeas corpus statute generously-as applying 
to virtually anyone
230 Id.
231 Id. at 432.
232 Id.
233 See id. at 434-51.
234 See id. at 434-42. The Court limited 
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), to
situations where the government moved 
the petitioner after he or she had properly
named the immediate custodian as the respondent 
and the district court had taken
jurisdiction, in which case the court could direct the writ 
to anyone within itsjurisdic-
uon who has authority to effectuate the 
petitioner's release. Padilla, 542 U.S. at
440-41. By contrast, here Padilla had been 
moved to South Carolina before he filed
his habeas petition in the New York district 
court, which therefore never acquired
jurisdiction. Id. at 441.
235 See id. at 442-51.
236 Id. at 460-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing 
that such personal involvement
distinguished this case from the run of the 
mill habeas petition). Moreover, as the
government itself had initiated grand jury proceedings 
in the New York federal
district court, and as that court could serve 
process on Rumsfeld, it was the most
appropriate venue. See id. at 463-64. On 
the merits, the dissenters opined that
neither Congress nor the Constitution authorized 
the executive branch to subject
American citizens like Padilla to lengthy, 
incommunicado detention solely for the
purpose of extracting information. See id. 
at 464 n.8, 465.
237 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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detained indefinitely as an "enemy combatant."23 8 Indeed, Rasul
shows how far the Court was willing to distort the statute to ensure
that even noncitizens outside of the United States could file habeas
petitions-a conclusion that contradicted Eisentrager, as even Bush's
most vocal opponents concede. 239 Furthermore, Hamdi is a very rare
case in which the Court struck down a war policy that enjoyed the
support of both political branches. 240
Nonetheless, the Court hardly handed the President a total
defeat, as many scholars claimed.241 On the contrary, it repeatedly
acknowledged the government's vital interest in conducting war effec-
238 Padilla is not to the contrary because the prisoner could still obtain habeas
relief in another federal district court. See Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 939, 971-81, 1000-06 (2003) (arguing that
meaningful habeas review should be available to American citizens-especially those
like Padilla who have been captured and are being detained in America during a time
when the nation has not mobilized totally for war-but not to aliens, particularly
those apprehended and imprisoned outside the United States like Rasul).
239 For example, Professor Katyal, who has taken a leading role in both litigating
and commenting upon the enemy combatant cases, admitted that Eisentrager was
directly on point in precluding habeas relief for the alien detainees in RasuL See
Katyal, supra note 138, at 1254-55. Rather, he argued that Eisentrager should not be
treated as binding precedent today because of the intervening transformation of both
the legal landscape (e.g., the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) in 1951, the United States' adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1955, and
the Warren Court's due process revolution) and the nature of war (especially the
stateless and perhaps perpetual War on Terrorism). See id. at 1238-39, 1251-56. Sim-
ilarly, Professor Cole declared that Rasul indicated the Court "may be ready to ques-
tion some of its earlier precedents" and that '[t]he Guantanamo litigants prevailed
not because of the strength of their legal arguments in court-the majority's statutory
construction argument is more than a little strained, as Justice Scalia amply illustrates
in his dissent-but because Guantanamo had become an international embarrass-
ment to the United States." David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immi-
grants' Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 627, 651, 653 (2006). Congress swiftly
overturned Rasu!'s implausible statutory interpretation as to the Guantanamo detain-
ees. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. But see James E. Pfander, The Limits of
Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 497 (2006) (main-
taining that the majority in Rasul correctly concluded that federal courts can review
the legality of detention by the American military overseas, but that such jurisdiction
rests not on the habeas statute but rather on the availability of declaratory and injunc-
tive relief under the general federal question jurisdiction statute).
240 Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (cautioning that congressional authorization of a President's
action creates an extremely strong presumption of constitutionality).
241 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; cf Sunstein, supra note 22, at 93-103
(contending that the Court properly issued narrow rulings that merely sustained
federal court jurisdiction to require fair hearings for detainees, but left the details of
such hearings to the political process).
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tively and with minimal judicial disruption. Accordingly, the Court
reaffirmed the political branches' superior expertise over national
security matters, the general wisdom of deference to executive judg-
ments, the government's need to protect military and foreign intelli-
gence, the President's power to detain enemy combatants (even
citizens) for the duration of a war, the minimal nature of due process
requirements (e.g., allowing hearsay and trial by properly authorized
military tribunals), and the rule against directing habeas writs to high-
level federal officials. Moreover, the Court highlighted the tentative
nature of its ruling by acknowledging that its "understanding may
unravel" in the future if "the practical circumstances of a given con-
flict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the devel-
opment of the law of war."24 2
In short, these three cases did not necessarily signal a major shift
in the Court's jurisprudence in which individual liberties will be
upheld vigorously against executive claims of national security.
Rather, they appear to reflect the established pattern of making com-
plex, discretionary legal and political determinations based on several
factors.
First, the emergency of September 2001 had dissipated, and the
President's indefinite (perhaps permanent) detention of alleged
enemy combatants without charges, access to counsel, or hearings
struck most Justices as extreme measures in fighting the War on Ter-
rorism.2 43 Moreover, widespread condemnation of the United States'
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and the abuse of prisoners
at Abu Ghraib (shocking photos of which were published while the
cases were pending) undoubtedly made the Court skeptical of the
242 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). See generally
Nicholas G. Green, Note, A "Blank Check": Judicial Review and the War Powers in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 56 S.C. L. REV. 581 (2005) (positing that the Court's rhetorical assertion
of broad review power contrasted with the practical effect of its decision, which was to
show great deference to the political branches' exercise of war powers within certain
outer limits); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 573 (2006) (concluding
that the Court correctly acknowledged the government's wide discretion in fighting
the War on Terrorism, but unwisely directed federal judges to assess the cases of
detainees, which will require judges to make factual and legal judgments about
national security that fall outside the scope of their individual and institutional
competence).
243 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2123-24; see also Lobel, supra note
8, at 769-90 (suggesting that continued judicial deference to the President could lead
to a dangerous governmental system in an era of perpetual warfare and permanent
emergency, especially given that the War on Terrorism is of indefinite duration-
unlike the nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars that bred the deferential
approach).
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administration's claim that it could be trusted to conduct the War on
Terrorism free from judicial (and even congressional) oversight.2 44
Second, the legal rights at stake were hallowed. The government
had attempted to deny the applicability of the ancient writ of habeas
corpus to vindicate the most basic constitutional liberty -freedom
from unlawful confinement.245
Third, President Bush, who squeaked into office in a bitterly con-
tested election in 2000246 and whose public approval ratings in 2004
hovered below fifty percent,2 47 did not have the political strength or
personal inclination to defy the Court's orders.
For the majority of Justices, all of the foregoing considerations
apparently outweighed their countervailing judgment that Congress
in the AUMF had authorized the President to detain enemy combat-
ants, even though such legislative-executive agreement in the past has
clinched the validity of the government's action. 248 The Court's statu-
tory interpretation in Hamdi is sound, although the opposite conclu-
sion is at least plausible. Indeed, Justice Souter's concurrence
represents the more typical method of construing a general statute
(the AUMF) as not authorizing a specific executive action (deten-
tion), thereby avoiding constitutional questions.249 Under either the
O'Connor or Souter approach, however, the upshot is that the Presi-
dent lost. Such result-oriented decisionmaking also characterizes
244 See Cole, supra note 239, at 653. Bush had argued that the President has inde-
pendent Article II power to incarcerate enemy combatants, even without congres-
sional authorization. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-17. In Bush's defense, the
President does have a special duty to protect American troops, and it is therefore
troubling that "a number of detainees ... have reappeared on the battlefield against
the United States." See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2125.
245 The Court accorded the Great Writ special treatment even during World War
1I, despite its overall tolerance of massive infringements of constitutional rights.
Immediately after issuing its infamous Korematsu decision, the Court granted the
habeas petition of a Japanese-American who had been imprisoned even though the
government had not disputed her loyalty. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294,
305-07 (1944), discussed supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
246 See RobertJ. Pushaw,Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative
Mirror, 18 CONST. ComMENT. 359, 382-90 (2001) (describing the election dispute and
the litigation it spawned).
247 See USA Today, Campaign 2004: USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/polls/usatodaypolls.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007); see aLso Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 278 (con-
trasting Bush's narrow win and lack of broad-based support with FDR's landslide vic-
tories and widespread popularity).
248 See, e.g., supra notes 74, 105-06, 109, 128-29, 136, 141,161, 168-69 and accom-
panying text.
249 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 93-96.
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Rasul, which rests on the dubious notion that Congress 
intended fed-
eral courts to entertain habeas actions instituted by 
foreign enemies
captured and imprisoned outside the United States.
If the facts on the ground had been different, however, 
I suspect
the results would have been different as well. For instance, 
if Septem-
ber 11 had been followed by more terrorist attacks, 
with attendant
public pressure on the government to use all means 
necessary to pro-
tect Americans and with President Bush enjoying overwhelming popu-
lar support, I doubt the Court would have adopted 
such an expansive
view of habeas corpus and due process. Of course, 
we can only hope
(perhaps naively) that such a situation never comes to pass, 
and that
therefore my hypothetical counterexample will 
never be tested.
B. The Legality of Military Commissions: Hramdan v. Rumsfeld
On November 13, 2001, George Bush invoked 
his authority
under the AUMF and the Constitution to order 
that any noncitizen
whom the President reasonably believed was an al 
Qaeda member or
had participated in terrorist activities must be tried 
by a military com-
mission appointed by the Secretary of Defense.
250 In July 2003, the
Bush Administration designated for such a trial 
Salim Hamdan, a
Yemeni national who had been captured in Afghanistan 
in November
2001 and transported to Guantanamo Bay in 
June 2002.251 In July
2004, Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit 
acts of terror-
ism--specifically, serving as bin Laden's bodyguard 
and driver from
1996-2001, accompanying him as he encouraged terrorist 
attacks,
transporting weapons used by al Qaeda, and receiving weapons 
train-
ing.252 Thereafter, a Combat Status Review Tribunal 
found Hamdan's
continued detention to be justified because he was an "enemy
combatant. '
' 253
In November 2004, a federal district court granted 
Hamdan a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the President's 
military com-
mission had been established in violation of the Uniform 
Code of Mil-
itary Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Convention
s
.
254 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, in an opinion 
joined by then-
Judge Roberts holding that the Geneva Conventions 
were not judi-
250 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in
10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004).
251 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759-60 
(2006).
252 Id. at 2760-61.
253 Id. at 2761.
254 Id. at 2761-62 (citing district court opinion and provisions 
from the Geneva
Conventions).
...... . • A A7 D VI W
2007] THE "ENEMY COMBATANT" CASES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1059
cially enforceable, that Quirin foreclosed constitutional objections to
military tribunals, and that Hamdan's trial would not violate the
UCMJ.2 55
After the Supreme Court accepted Hamdan's petition for review,
Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) .256 Sec-
tion 1005(e) (1) overturned Rasul by providing that "no court, justice,
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. '25 7 Section
1005(h) (1) made this provision "effect[ive] on the date of the enact-
ment of this Act [December 30, 2005] ."258 The government moved to
dismiss on the ground that the DTA deprived the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction. 25 9
Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined in full by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer and in part by Justice Kennedy, ruled that the
Court had jurisdiction, that Congress had not authorized these mili-
tary commissions, and that their structure and procedures violated the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. 260 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito vigorously dissented.2 6' For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to
examine the jurisdictional and merits holdings (and corresponding
dissents) separately.
1. Jurisdictional Issues
a. Statutory Repeal of Appellate Jurisdiction
The government contended that the DTA made plain that "no
court" (including the Supreme Court) had jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions by Guantanamo Bay detainees, effective December
255 Id. at 2762 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38, 42-43 (2005)).
256 Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739-44 (2005) (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C., including titles 10, 28, and 42).
257 Id. § 1005(e) (1), 119 Stat. at 2741-42 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West
Supp. 2006)). The Court in Rasul had creatively construed the general habeas corpus
statute as extending to aliens at Guantanamo. See supra Part 1I1.A.2. As to such peti-
tioners outside of Guantanamo, however, Rasul remained in force until the passage of
the Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, § 950j (b) (Oct. 17,
2006).
258 Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(h)(1), 119 Stat. at 2743 (codified at 10
U.S.C.A. § 801 note (West Supp. 2006)).
259 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct at 2762.
260 See id. at 2762-98.
261 See id. at 2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2849-55 (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts did not participate
because the D.C. Circuit decision he had joined was being reviewed.
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30, 2005.262 This argument, accepted by the dissenters, rested on long
and unbroken precedent, which established two principles.2 6 1 First,
Article III grants Congress plenary power to make "exceptions" to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 264 Second, a federal law oust-
ing jurisdiction applies to pending cases, except when the statute
explicitly reserves such jurisdiction. 265
The majority characterized this precedent as setting forth not an
ironclad rule, but merely a "presumption against jurisdiction. ' 266
This presumption could be rebutted by ordinary principles of statu-
tory construction--here, that "a negative inference may be drawn
from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is
included in other provisions of the same statute."267 Applying this
interpretive canon to the DTA, Justice Stevens observed that section
1105(h)(2) expressly made sections 1005(e)(2) and (e) (3) -which
grant the D.C. Circuit "exclusive jurisdiction" to review the "final deci-
sions" of Combat Status Review Tribunals and military commissions -
applicable to pending cases, whereas section 1005(h) (1) contained no
such explicit termination of pending claims as to section
1005(e)(1).2 68 Hence, the majority held that Congress had not
262 Id. at 2762-63 (majority opinion).
263 See id. at 2810-18 (Scalia, J,, dissenting, joined by Thomas and Alito,JJ.),
264 Id. at 2819 (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)). In
light of this long-recognized constitutional power, Justice Scalia rejected the major-
ity's suggestion that its interpretation was preferable because it avoided "'grave ques-
tions about Congress' authority to impinge upon this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
particularly in habeas cases.'" Id. (citing majority opinion).
265 Id. at 2810-12 (supporting this proposition with citations to a dozen Supreme
Court cases dating back to 1809).
266 Id. at 2764 (majority opinion).
267 Id. at 2765.
268 Id. at 2765-66 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). Lindh
concerned two revisions in 1996 to the federal habeas statute: Chapter 153 amended
the scope of collateral review by federal courts in noncapital cases, while Chapter 154
was added to address state capital cases. Chapter 154 explicitly applied to pending
cases, so the Court negatively inferred that Chapter 153 (which contained no such
provision) did not. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-30. Justice Stevens interpreted the DTA
the same way. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2766.
By contrast, the dissenters emphasized that both statutory chapters in Lindh had
effects that were not merely procedural but also substantive. Because substantive laws
are presumed not to apply retroactively, Congress understood that it had to state
explicitly if a chapter would apply to pending cases. See id. at 2813-14 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327). In that situation, Chapter 153's absence of
such a statement justified the inference that it would not reach pending cases. Id. at
2813-14. Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that sections 1005(e) (2) and (3) conferred
new jurisdiction on federal courts (granting the D.C. Circuit exclusive review), and
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intended to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction over Hamdan's
case.
269
b. Abstention
The government urged abstention under Schlesinger 
v. Council-
man,270 in which the Court declined to consider 
an army officer's con-
tention that his charge for marijuana possession off-base 
was not
sufficiently connected to his military service to 
trigger the jurisdiction
of a court-martial. 27 1 Justice Stevens explained 
that neither of the
comity considerations identified in Councilman 
was present. First, con-
cern for maintaining military discipline and 
efficiency were inapt
because Hamdan was not a member 
of America's armed forces.
272
Second, Councilman showed judicial respect for Congress's decision 
to
create "an integrated system of military courts 
and review proce-
dures,"27 3 whereas Hamdan's military tribunal 
fell outside that
system.
2 7 4
that such laws creating (rather than stripping) jurisdiction 
are subject to the usual
rule of nonretroactive application. Id. at 2813-15.
269 Justice Stevens buttressed this conclusion 
by citing floor statements and prior
drafts of the DTA indicating that Congress 
deliberately had omitted section
1005(e)(1) from its directive that the statute should 
otherwise apply to pending
claims. Id. at 2766, 2767 n.10 (majority opinion). But see id. at 2815-17 
(Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (adducing contrary legislative history, stressing 
the unreliability of such
evidence, and arguing that resort to such history 
is improper when the statute's text is
clear).
Hamdan also claimed that interpreting the DTA 
as stripping the Court of juris-
diction would amount to an implicit suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus, which
Article I forbids except in rare circumstances. 
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Justice
Scalia countered that the writ did not extend 
to an enemy alien detained outside of
the United States' territorial jurisdiction. See Hamdan, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2818 (citingJohn-
son v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950)). Moreover, 
even if a noncitizen enemy
could apply for a habeas writ, Congress had 
provided a constitutionally adequate
substitute: D.C. Circuit review would suffice to 
test the legality of the trial by military
commission, and the Supreme Court retained 
its certiorari jurisdiction over the Court
of Appeals' decision. See id. at 2818-19.
270 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
271 Id. at 740, cited in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 
2769-70.
272 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
273 Id. at 2270 (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758).
274 Id. at 2271. Justice Stevens also relied on 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in
which the Court declined to abstain because 
of the importance of the case, the
public's interest in a swift decision, and the judiciary's duty 
to review alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights. Hamdan, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2771-72 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 19). Justice Scalia replied that in Quiin, unlike here, 
the federal government had
sought a quick resolution, and that in any event 
Quirin was inapposite because Con-
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In response, Justice Scalia pointed out that Councilman's first fac-
tor also weighed "military necessities" and "exigencies," and he rea-
soned that "[ i]f 'military necessities' relating to 'duty' and 'discipline'
[in a marijuana case] required abstention in Councilman, military
necessities relating to the disabling, deterrence, and punishment of
the mass-murdering terrorists of September 11 require abstention all
the more here."275 As for the second criterion, he noted that Con-
gress in the DTA had established a system allowing for military com-
missions and authorizing federal appellate review. 276 Justice Scalia
warned that ignoring the DTA's process "br[ought] the Judicial
Branch into direct conflict with the Executive in an area where the
Executive's competence is maximal and ours is virtually nonexistent.
We should exercise our equitable discretion to avoid such conflict.
Instead, the Court rushes headlong to meet it."2 77
c. Analyzing the Court's Jurisdictional Ruling
The majority's jurisdictional conclusions are debatable. First, as
Justice Scalia emphasized, "the Court. . . cannot cite a single case in
the history of Anglo-American law (before today) in which a jurisdic-
tion-stripping provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases,
absent an explicit statutory reservation. '" 278 Second, under Councilman
gress in the DTA had created a system of Article III review of military commissions
that did not exist in 1942. Id. at 2822 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 2821 (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757).
276 Id. at 2821-22.
277 Id. at 2822.
278 Id. at 2812 (emphasis omitted). Even David Cole, perhaps the most ardent
legal critic of the War on Terrorism, deemed it "remarkable" that "the Court decided
the case at all in the face of Congress' efforts to strip the Court ofjurisdiction." Cole,
supra note 9. Similarly, Martin Flaherty conceded that the Republican Congress likely
intended the DTA to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction in Hamdan, but applauded the
Court for exploiting an "ambiguity" in the DTA's text to assert power. Flaherty, supra'
note 9, at 58.
My criticism of the Court for brushing aside a century and a half of case law does
not mean I agree with that precedent. Rather, I reject the conventional wisdom that
Congress can remove the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over a federal ques-
tion "case" and not assign that case to a lower federal court, thereby leaving final
decisionmaking power in state tribunals. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congres-
sional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of
Article III, 1997 BYU L. REv. 847, 848-97 (developing the thesis that Congress must
vest judicial power over all federal law cases in a federal forum). Under my approach,
however, the DTA is valid because Congress merely reallocated jurisdiction over a
federal question case from one Article III court (the Supreme Court) to another (the
D.C. Circuit), not to a state tribunal.
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abstention would have been justified.279
Thus, the Court's decision to assert jurisdiction likely reflected
considerations unrelated to the straightforward application of the
legal principles set forth in previous cases. From a practical stand-
point, declining jurisdiction (or abstaining) might have cost the
majority a golden opportunity to affirm the authority of both the judi-
ciary and Congress to limit the President's exercise of war powers. 2 0
Of course, it is hardly novel for the Court to manipulate jurisdic-
tional doctrines in the military context. Almost invariably, however,
the Justices have imaginatively interpreted jurisdictional statutes or
279 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2820-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because abstention is
based upon equitable discretion rather than black-letter rules, the only fair criticism
of the Court is that it has exercised such discretion unwisely, not unlawfully. In
Hamdan, the Court could have obviated the need to decide several legal issues (and
perhaps the entire case) by waiting until after the military commission rendered its
decision and the D.C. Circuit conducted its review. Once again, my doubts about the
Court's application of its abstention doctrines should not be taken as signifying my
acceptance of their legal validity. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement
Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory that Self-Restraint
Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1289, 1300-05, 1338-39 (2005) (contend-
ing that allowing federal judges to abstain from deciding federal law cases violates
their Article III duty to exercise all federal question jurisdiction conferred by Con-
gress); Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 38, at 398-99 (recognizing limited constitu-
tional exceptions allowing courts to decline jurisdiction to avoid rendering advisory
opinions, decisions on political questions, or judgments that can be revised by the
elected branches).
280 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 99-103 (arguing that the Court defied Congress's
command to refrain from exercising jurisdiction and ignored venerable precedent in
order to reach its desired result of blocking the military commissions). Had the
Court not taken jurisdiction, Hamdan would have been tried by the military commis-
sion and appealed any adverse rulings to the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court-a
process likely to consume several years. By that time, one (or more) of the Justices in
the majority might have been replaced by jurists more sympathetic to strong executive
power. Chief Justice Roberts (as a circuit judge) and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas all supported the President's authority to establish military commissions, and
so the addition of a similar-minded Justice would have led to a different result. Now
that Hamdan has been decided, however, a new conservative Justice dedicated to stare
decisis might reaffirm that case even if he or she thought it was wrongly decided as an
original matter. Of course, the Court in the future might overrule or distinguish
Hamdan, but doing so might exact political and institutional costs.
Moreover, even if the Court's composition remained the same, perhaps the new
President who assumes office in 2008 will be more willing to challenge the Court
because he or she will be more popular than Bush, whose approval rating had sunk to
a historic low of thirty-one percent in May 2006. Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee,
Poll Gives Bush His Worst Marks Yet On Major Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at Al.
Conversely, the new President might adopt less aggressive policies regarding enemy
combatants, thereby mooting the legal issues.
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invoked doctrines like justiciability and abstention to avoid reaching a
decision on the merits. To take the most familiar example, the Presi-
dent's wartime actions have often been deemed unreviewable political
questions.28 1 Hamdan presents the exceedingly rare situation in
which the Court distorted its jurisdictional precedent to reach a con-
troversial legal issue. Examination of its decision on the merits reveals
that the Court similarly disregarded its entrenched case law.
2. The Legality of Military Commissions
The majority ruled that Congress had not expressly authorized
Hamdan's commission28 2 and that its structure and procedures vio-
lated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. 283 These two hold-
ings-and the stinging dissents they prompted-will be examined in
turn.
a. Congressional Authorization
Justice Stevens initially noted that the Court had never had occa-
sion to define precisely the scope of the President's implicit constitu-
tional power to convene military tribunals.28 4 Most importantly, in
Quirin the Court ducked this question because it concluded that Con-
gress, through Article of War 15, had authorized the use of military
commissions to try offenses against the law of war.285 The majority
observed that Article 15 had been incorporated into Article 21 of the
UCMJ, which provides that the "'Ulurisdiction of courts-martial ...
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . .of con-
281 See supra notes 67-77, 83, 100-04, 107, 124-25, 154-63 and accompanying
text.
282 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75; id. at 2799-2800, 2808 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
283 See id. at 2786-98. Justice Kennedy agreed that Hamdan's commission was
unauthorized and that its structure and procedures were invalid. See id. at 2799-808.
Therefore, he found it unnecessary to decide whether the law of war included
conspiracy or whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions required that
the accused be present at all stages of a trial. Id. at 2809. However, Justice Stevens
and three colleagues reached these two questions. See id. at 2775-86 (plurality opin-
ion) (determining that the law of war did not recognize conspiracy and that Common
Article 3 guaranteed the right to be continuously present at trial). But see id. at
2826-38, 2846-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting these conclusions).
284 See id. at 2774 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2772-74 (explaining that mili-
tary commissions had arisen in the nineteenth century out of necessity-to enable
commanders to try cases that did not fall within the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
which at that time was very limited).
285 See id. at 2774 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)); see also id. at 2802
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (similarly interpreting Quirin).
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current jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that 
by statute
or by the law of war may be tried by such ... 
commissions.'" 2 8 6 The
Court interpreted this provision not as a sweeping 
mandate for the
President to establish military commissions 
whenever he deemed
them necessary, but rather as preserving the President's 
constitutional
power to convene military commissions 
in accordance with the law.
28 7
Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had 
not intended to expand
Article 21 in the AUMF or the DTA, neither 
of which contains lan-
guage specifically allowing military 
tribunals at Guantanamo Bay.
288
286 Id. at 2774 (majority opinion) (quoting Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, art.
15, 64 Stat. 115 (1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 
821 (2000))).
287 Id. (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29).
288 Id. at 2775. Justice Stevens read the 
UCMJ, AUMF, and DTA as "at most
[acknowledging] a general Presidential authority to convene 
military commissions in
circumstances where justified under the 'Constitution and laws,' 
including the law of
war." Id. Hence, Justice Stevens (along with Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer)
thought it necessary "to decide whether Hamdan's 
military commission [was] sojusti-
fied." Id.
This plurality concluded that the government had 
failed to charge Hamdan with
any crime that fell within the jurisdiction of a military commission, 
which was
restricted to trying certain offenses recognized by 
the laws of war that had been com-
mitted within the theater of war and had occurred 
during (not before or after) the
armed conflict-here, since September 11, 2001. 
See id. at 2775-79 (plurality opin-
ion). Justice Stevens asserted that, although the common 
law of war might include
crimes not defined by statute if the precedent 
for doing so was unambiguous, the
charged offense of conspiracy had no such pedigree. 
See id. at 2779-85 (maintaining
that conspiracy had not been deemed an independent 
crime under the laws of war in
American practice or in authoritative international 
law documents such as the Geneva
Conventions, the Hague Conventions, or the 
International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg). He conceded that the defendants in Quirin 
had been charged with
conspiracy, but pointed out that the Court had declined 
to decide whether conspiracy
was a stand-alone offense under the laws of war because 
the other charges (commit-
ting overt acts of espionage and sabotage) clearly sufficed to 
trigger the jurisdiction of
a military commission. See id. at 2781-82.
In dissent, Justice Thomas initially argued that the 
Court had no business second-
guessing the President's judgment that Hamdan had acted within 
the "theater of war"
(anywhere al Qaeda operated) during the armed conflict 
(which Bush determined
began in 1996, when al Qaeda declared ajihad against America). 
See id. at 2826-28
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, he characterized the 
common law of war not as
consisting of clear, fixed principles but rather as 
flexible, evolutionary, and respectful
of the judgment of military commanders. See id. at 2828-30. 
Finally, Thomas
contended that Hamdan had been charged with 
two offenses-membership in a war-
criminal enterprise and conspiracy to commit war 
crimes-that had existed since at
least the Civil War. See id. at 2830-36 (citing numerous 
cases); see also id. at 2838
(noting that Quirin and Yamashita refuted the plurality's claim 
that military commis-
sions were always limited to rendering swift justice on the battlefield).
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In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the AUMF, 
by authorizing
the President to use "'all necessary and appropriate 
force"' against
those he determined were responsible for the 9/11 
attacks, conferred
power to try Hamdan by military commission for 
his involvement with
al Qaeda.28 9 Thomas demonstrated that such broad congressional
delegations to the President had always been 
construed as including
discretion to submit enemy combatants to military 
tribunals, and that
the Court had recognized their validity in cases 
like Quiin.290 More-
over, Justice Thomas maintained that Article 21 
of the UCMJ did not
set forth the entire reach of authorization of military 
commissions,
but rather presupposed their existence under 
an independent grant
of power (here, the AUMF).291 This legislative approval 
meant that
judicial deference should be at its zenith, and accordingly 
Justice
Thomas chastised the Court for second-guessing 
President Bush's
decision to employ such tribunals and "flout[ing] our well-established
duty to respect the Executive's judgment in matters of 
military
operations. '29
2
b. The Military Commission's Structure and 
Procedure
The majority criticized two aspects of the commission's proce-
dures. First, the accused could be excluded 
from, and prevented
from learning what evidence was presented during, 
any part of the
proceeding that the presiding officer decided 
to close for "'national
security interests"' (e.g., safeguarding classified information; 
protect-
ing law enforcement and intelligence 
sources or activities) .293
289 Id. at 2823-25 (citation omitted).
290 Id. at 2824-25. Justice Thomas stressed that, 
because Congress cannot antici-
pate every possible action the President might find 
it necessary to take, a broad legis-
lative authorization should not be read to imply 
that Congress intended to deprive
the President of powers not specifically enumerated. 
See id. at 2823-24 (citing Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)).
291 Id. at 2825.
292 Id. at 2823. "The Court's evident belief 
that it is qualified to pass on the
'[m]ilitary necessity' of the Commander in Chiefs decision 
to employ a particular
form of force against our enemies is . . . antithetical 
to our constitutional struc-
ture . . . ." Id. (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
635 (1863)). See generally
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2127-31 
(providing detailed scholarly support
for all of justice Thomas's arguments).
293 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. Dep't 
of Defense,
Military Commission Order No. 1, § 6(B)(3) (Aug. 31, 
2005) [hereinafter DOD
Order], available at http://,ww.defenselinkmil/news/Sept2005/d
2 050902rder
.pdf). The accused's civilian lawyer could also be barred, 
whereas his appointed mili-
tary defense counsel would be privy to the closed 
sessions but could be forbidden
from revealing to the client what had transpired. 
Id. (citing DOD Order, supra).
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Second, the presiding officer had discretion to 
(a) admit any evidence
he deemed to have probative value to a reasonable 
person,294 and
(b) deny the defendant access to classified and protected information
if he determined that doing so would not result 
in denial of a fair
trial.295 The Court held that these procedures 
violated both the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.
i. UCMJ
The majority interpreted UCMJ Article 36(b) as requiring that
the procedural rules promulgated by the President 
for courts-martial
and military commissions be "'uniform 
insofar as practicable.'
296
Justice Stevens asserted that President Bush had 
failed to make an offi-
cial determination of impracticability to justify his deviation from 
ordi-
nary court-martial procedures, and that nothing 
in the record
supported such a divergence.
297 The Court conceded that Yamashita
was "a glaring historical exception to this general 
rule [of uniform-
294 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2787 (citing DOD Order, supra 
note 293, § 6(D) (1)).
295 Id. at 2787 (citing DOD Order, supra note 293, § 6(D) 
(5) (b)). The majority
rejected the government's argument that the Court should 
wait to consider
Hamdan's procedural challenges until after the 
commission's final decision and an
appeal to the D.C. Circuit under the DTA, for 
two reasons. First, judicial review
would be at the Court of Appeals' discretion unless 
Hamdan received a prison sen-
tence over ten years or the death penalty. Id. 
at 2788. Second, Hamdan had already
been excluded from his own trial-a procedural 
violation the Court could appropri-
ately review immediately. Id.; see also id. at 2805-07 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (echo-
ing these points, and emphasizing that the military 
commission's many deviations
from an ordinary court-martial's structure, composition, 
and procedures cast doubt
on the validity of Hamdan's trial).
296 Id. at 2790-92 (majority opinion) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) 
(2000)); see also
id. at 2801, 2804-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same). The 
Court acknowledged that
the President, pursuant to Article 36(a), had determined 
that it was impracticable to
apply to Hamdan's commission the rules governing 
criminal trials in federal district
courts. Id. at 2791 (majority opinion). Because Hiamdan did 
not demand an original
federal forum, however, the Court had no 
need to examine this presidential
judgment.
297 See id. at 2791-92; see also id. at 2804-08 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (to similar
effect). For instance, the majority maintained that the government 
did not suggest
that there would be logistical difficulties in applying 
the usual rules of admissibility of
evidence at Hamdan's trial. Id. at 2792 (majority opinion). Moreover, 
the Court con-
cluded that the considerable general danger posed 
by international terrorism had not
been shown to require variances from ordinary procedures 
in Hamdan's case. Id.; see
also id. at 2805 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (noting that no 
exigency required a speedy
trial, given that the government had already held 
Hamdan for over four years as an
enemy combatant and would continue to detain 
him). Justice Stevens deemed the
absence of a presidential justification under Article 36(b) "particularly 
disturbing" in
light of the failure to honor a fundamental right 
afforded by both the UCMJ and
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ity]," but concluded that Congress had responded to criticism of this
decision by expanding the category of persons entitled to UCMJ pro-
tection to those in the position of Yamashita (and Hamdan).9 8
Justice Thomas responded that cases like Quirin, Yamashita, and
Madsen had construed the predecessor of Article 36(b) as recognizing
the President's longstanding power to establish military commissions
and prescribe their procedures. 299 Thomas denied that later amend-
ments to the UCMJ had limited executive authority; on the contrary,
Article 36 had reaffirmed the President's discretion to create commis-
sions that departed from ordinary procedures when he determined
that uniformity would be impracticable.300 Moreover, Justice Thomas
contended that, even if the majority's reading of Article 36(b) were
correct, President Bush had determined that it was impracticable to
use court-martial rules because the War on Terrorism posed unique
dangers to national security.30
ii. The Geneva Conventions
The Court further ruled that the military commission's proce-
dures ran afoul of the Geneva Conventions.30 2 Initially, Justice Ste-
vens found that the Conventions were judicially enforceable because
UCMJ Article 21 required compliance with the law of war (which
included those Conventions). 30 3 In particular, Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions gave all prisoners captured in a conflict in
ordinary courts-martial: the right to be present. Id. at 2792 (majority opinion) (citing
10 U.S.C.A. § 839(c) (West Supp. 2006)).
298 Id. at 2788-89; see also id. at 2803-04, 2807-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (like-
wise stressing the limited relevance of World War II cases decided before Congress
had enacted its current legal regime regarding courts-martial).
299 Id. at 2840-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 2839-40; see also id. at 2842 (claiming that UCMJ Article 36 sought to
ensure uniform procedures across the branches of the armed forces, not between
courts-martial and military commissions).
301 Id. at 2842-43 (citing statements of executive branch officials).
302 See id. at 2793-96 (majority opinion); id. at 2799, 2802-04, 2807-08 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
303 Id. at 2793-94 (majority opinion). In Stevens's view, Article 21 controlled
because it had been passed after the Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950), which contained a footnote stating that the Conventions were enforcea-
ble only by political and military (not judicial) authorities. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794
(citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14); see also id. at 2802-03 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (contending that Article 21 had sapped Eisentrager of precedential force). But
see id. at 2844-46 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (asserting that nothing in Article 21 altered
Eisentrager's correct holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforce-
able, and that in any event Common Article 3 covered only military tribunals, whereas
UCMJ Article 21 concerned the different issue of whether an "offender" or "offense"
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the territory of a signatory party (such as Afghanistan) the right to "'a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees ...
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'' 0 4 The majority
defined "a regularly constituted court" to mean a nation's preestab-
lished ordinary military courts, which in the United States were the
courts-martial created by Congress.3 0 5 Hence, a military commission
could not possibly be "regularly constituted" absent a demonstrated
practical need to depart from court-martial practice. 30 6
By contrast, the dissenters argued that Hamdan's military com-
mission was a "regularly constituted court" because (1) it had been
established pursuant to UCMJ Article 21 (which preserved the Presi-
dent's power to convene such commissions), and (2) such tribunals
had long been recognized as valid for trials of enemy combatants
accused of war crimes. 0 7 Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized that
the commission afforded all the indispensable judicial guarantees
(e.g., the right to counsel and the "reasonable doubt" standard),
except for access to proceedings and evidence that would compromise
national security-and even then, denials of such access would be
judicially reviewable to ensure a fair trial.30 8
was suitable for a military trial (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
§821 (2000)).
304 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (majority opinion).
305 Id. at 2796-97; see also id. at 2799-800, 2802-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
306 Id. at 2796-97 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2799-800, 2802-08 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). The plurality further concluded that the military commission con-
vened to uy Hamdan violated Common Article 3 because it denied the accused the
right to be present and to be privy to inculpatory evidence. Id. at 2798 (plurality
opinion) (citing DOD Order, supra note 293, §§ 6(B) (3), (D)); see also id. at 2785-86
(declaring that military necessity did not justify the President's resort to a military
commission rather than a court-martial). Justice Thomas replied that the executive
had preserved these rights to the extent feasible and had created an exception only
where necessary to protect national security and classified information, and had
retained judicial review to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 2847-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2846-47 (suggesting that Hamdan's claims under Common Article 3
would not become ripe unless and until the military commission convicted and sen-
tenced him). Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to decide whether Common Arti-
cle 3 conferred a right to be present at all stages of a trial and to have access to all
evidence. Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307 See id. at 2847 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2850-53 (Alito, J., dissenting).
308 See id. at 2848-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2850-53 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that any procedural or evidentiary problems could be reme-
died through judicial review, not by declaring the military commission itself
illegitimate).
1070 NOTRE .
c. National Security and the Rule of Law
Ultimately, Justice Thomas concluded that the Constitution's
text, structure, history, and precedent, as well as 
various federal stat-
utes, all dictated judicial deference to President Bush's decision 
to
create a military commission to try an enemy 
combatant.30 9 More-
over, he asserted that the majority's disregard of well-settled 
law was
singularly dangerous:
We are not engaged in a traditional battle with a 
nation-state, but
with a worldwide, hydra-headed enemy, who lurks 
in the shadows
conspiring to reproduce the atrocities of September 
11, 2001, and
who has boasted of sending suicide bombers into 
civilian gather-
ings, has proudly distributed videotapes of beheadings 
of civilian
workers, and has tortured and dismembered captured 
American
soldiers.... [The Court's holding] sorely hamper[s] the President's
ability to confront and defeat a new and 
deadly enemy.310
The majority acknowledged that Hamdan might be a dangerous
individual who wished to hurt and kill innocent 
civilians, but noted
that he "[did] not challenge . . . the Government's 
power to detain
him for the duration of active hostilities in 
order to prevent such
harm."31 1 Nonetheless, the Court maintained 
that, if the executive
branch sought to try Hamdan criminally, it 
had to comply with the
"rule of law."53 2 Justice Breyer echoed those concerns in his brief
concurrence:
The Court's conclusion ultimately rests upon a single 
ground: Con-
gress has not issued the Executive a "blank check." 
Indeed, Con-
gress has denied the President the legislative authority 
to create
military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing 
prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the 
authority he
believes necessary.
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress,
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our
Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, 
that insistence
strengthens the Nation's ability to determine -through 
democratic
309 See id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
310 Id. at 2838; see also id. at 2830 (warning that the majority's 
approach "has
dangerous implications for the Executive's ability 
to discharge his duties as Com-
mander in Chief"); id. at 2839 (claiming that the Court's "willingness 
to second-guess
the determination of the political branches" 
was "both unprecedented and
dangerous").
311 Id. at 2798 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2804-05 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)
(recognizing the gravity of the charges against Hamdan and 
the government's right
to imprison him).
312 Id. at 2798 (majority opinion).
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means-how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in
those democratic means. Our Court today simply does the same. 3 13
3. A Critique of Hamdan
Despite the pledges of fealty to the rule of law by Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Kennedy, Hamdan illustrates that law has little to do with
judicial review of war powers. Of course, the majority cited cases in
which the Court had checked the President's attempts to claim sweep-
ing authority, like Milligan and Youngstown, but they concerned
domestic decisions affecting the rights of American citizens. In the
precedent directly on point (Quirin and Yamashita), the Court con-
firmed the President's power to try alien enemy combatants by his
own military tribunals, refused to question his judgment that these
organs were necessary for national security, and declined to review
their procedures. 3 14 Indeed, even Hamdan's own lawyer, Georgetown
Law Professor Neal Katyal, conceded as much in a 2004 essay.31 5
It is possible that Quiin and Yamashita were wrongly decided.
Perhaps, too, our most revered Presidents-Washington, Lincoln, and
Roosevelt-illegally created military commissions. And maybe Con-
gress has erred in consistently recognizing the validity of such execu-
tive power. If the Court in Hamdan had come to these weighty
conclusions, it should have struck down this federal legislation as
unconstitutional and overruled its incorrect decisions. Instead, the
majority purported to apply its precedent and the applicable statutes,
but stretched them beyond reasonable bounds in three key rulings.
First, the plurality and two concurring opinions cited the lack of
congressional authorization for military commissions as dispositive.3 1 6
313 Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
314 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 91-93, 103-06; see also id. at 93-94 (explaining that
the Bush military commissions featured many more procedural and evidentiary pro-
tections than those upheld in Quifin and Yamashita).
315 See Katyal, supra note 138, at 1253-54 (admitting that Quinin supported the
validity of military commissions to try alien "enemy combatants," but arguing that
Quirin should be treated as a "lapsed precedent" because it involved strikingly differ-
ent factual and legal circumstances than the War on Terrorism); see also Katyal &
Tribe, supra note 8, at 1284-85 (to similar effect). I disagree with this attempt to
distinguish Quirin, for reasons set forth infra note 317.
316 See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text; see also Flaherty, supra note 9, at
53-62 (praising the Court for insisting on Congress's focused involvement, including
a requirement that Congress must clearly approve military tribunals and other war
measures); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1259-77, 1298-311 (arguing in 2002 that
President Bush's unilateral creation of military commissions violated the Constitution
because he had failed to obtain specific legislative authorization and no emergency
justified bypassing Congress).
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This conclusion conflicts with the most likely meaning of several stat-
utes. Most significantly, in 1950 Congress effectively codified Quiin's
holding that Article 15 authorized the President to establish military
tribunals by adopting Article 15's language verbatim in Article 21 of
the UCMJ.3 1 7 No later statute has altered this executive power, and
post-September 11 legislation has reinforced it and triggered its exer-
cise. For example, the AUMF directed the President to use "all neces-
sary and appropriate force"318s against the terrorists, and such force
has always been understood to include detaining enemy combatants
for the war's duration and trying them by military commission. 31 9
317 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 274-75; see also Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 23, at 2130 (citing supporting legislative history). An eminent
scholar, writing shortly after the UCMJ had been enacted and hence unbiased by
subsequent events, concluded that Article 21 acknowledged the President's long-
standing and exclusive Article II power to create military commissions and to deter-
mine their powers and procedures. See RoSSITER, supra note 84, at 102-03, 109; see
also supra notes 90, 110-14, 136 and accompanying text (describing the history of
military tribunals established without congressional authorization). Disregarding this
history and case law, the Court ruled that Article 21 does not sanction military com-
missions. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
Professors Katyal and Tribe have claimed that Quirin should be discounted as
precedent in interpreting Article 15 because the Court rendered its judgment hastily,
under extreme political pressure, and in the midst of a total war waged pursuant to
Congress's declaration of war and its authorization of military commissions. Katyal &
Tribe, supra note 8, at 1284-91. That argument is refuted by Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341 (1952), discussed supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. The Court
decided Madsen long after World War II had ended and under no pressures of time
or governmental strong-arming. It expressly reaffirmed Quirin's holding that "'[bjy
the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far
as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases."' Madsen, 343 U.S.
at 355 n.22 (quoting ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)); see also id. at 352 ("Article
15 ... states unequivocally that Congress has not deprived such commissions or tribu-
nals of the[ir] existing jurisdiction . . . ." (citing In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);
Quiin, 317 U.S. 1)); id. at 355 (citing Yamashita as approving Quiin's interpretation
of Article 15). Finally, the Court in Madsen noted that Congress had recently reen-
acted Article 15 as Article 21 of the new UCMJ to preserve the existing practice
regarding military tribunals. Id. at 315 n.17. Thus, it is clear that Quinn is still alive
and well.
318 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. 11 2003)).
319 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2127-33 (citing history); see also
Paulsen, supra note 59, at 252, 256-57 (contending that the AUMF contained argua-
bly the broadest delegation of war powers ever to a President, and certainly author-
ized the creation of military commissions). Nonetheless, two distinguished scholars
have maintained that, although imprisoning unlawful combatants is part of the Presi-
dent's power as Commander in Chief to wage war successfully, military commissions
fall into the different realm of adjudicating and punishing alleged violations of law.
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Thus, it is difficult to fathom why the Court 
found that the AUMF
implicitly authorized the former (Hamdi) but not 
the latter
(Hamdan). Rather, the best, and most consistent, legal 
interpretation
would be that the AUMF conferred both 
powers (Justice Thomas's
view) .320 Any doubt about whether Congress authorized 
military com-
missions in the AUMF or UCMJ Article 21 should 
have been erased by
Section 1005(e) (3) of the Detainee Treatment Act.
321 Congress must
have thought President Bush had legally formed 
the military commis-
sions, or else it would have repudiated them 
rather than providing for
an appeal from their judgments.
3 22
The Court's strict construction of statutory 
provisions that
seemed to confer power on the President 
(the AUMF, UCMJ, and
DTA) contrasts sharply with its loose interpretation 
of sections
1005(e) (1) and (h) of the DTA, which appeared to deprive 
it of juris-
diction. Therefore, the majority Justices' suggestion 
that they were
modestly trying to ensure congressional authorization 
for government
action is true only as to the executive 
branch, not the judiciary.
3 23
Second, the Court concluded that Bush's 
military commissions
violated UCMJ Article 36(b) by unjustifiably employing 
different pro-
cedures than courts-martial.
324 However, Article 36's language, legis-
lative history, and background norms all 
indicate that it simply
acknowledged the President's long-established 
authority to prescribe
procedures for military commissions -and 
to diverge from court-mar-
See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1270. Although 
that distinction has a certain logic
in theory, in practice the Court has always 
accepted the President's determination
that trials by military tribunal are one aspect of 
prosecuting war.
320 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823-25 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-98 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see also Yoo, supra
note 14, at 97, 99-100, 109-10 (supportingjustice Thomas's analysis). 
Justices Souter
and Ginsburg also showed intellectual consistency 
(albeit a disdain for precedent) in
articulating the converse of Thomas's position: 
that the AUMF authorized neither
detention nor military commissions because 
of countervailing statutory provisions.
See supra notes 205-07, 259, 282-88 and accompanying 
text (summarizing this
approach). Finally,Justice Scalia also demonstrated internal 
logic by arguing that the
President cannot detain or try by military commission 
any United States citizen (such
as Hamdi), but can take such actions against noncitizens 
(like Hamdan). See supra
notes 207-13, 226-29 and accompanying text (describing justice 
Scalia's perspective).
321 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42 
(2005) (codified at
10 U.S.C.A. § 801 note (West Supp. 2006)).
322 SeeYoo, supra note 14, at 97.
323 See Roger Pilon, Foreword: Politics and Law, 
Again, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REV., at
vii, xiii (asserting that the majority ignored Congress's exercise 
of its power to limit
the Court's jurisdiction while simultaneously purporting to 
enhance Congress's
authority).
324 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790-92.
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tial procedures when he determined that following 
them would be
impracticable .
32 5
Third, the Court held that UCMJ Article 21's 
reference to the
"law of war" incorporated Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conven-
tions -and implicitly overruled EisentrageS interpretation 
of the Con-
ventions as unenforceable judicially.
326 Here the Court made, in
Professor Yoo's words, a "glaring mistake 
of simple chronology.
'
"327
The UCMJ could not possibly have overturned 
Eisentrager, which was
decided a month after the UCMJ's enactment.
328 Similarly, Congress
could not have intended to incorporate Common 
Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions -ratified in 1955-into 
the UCMJ, which was
passed in 1950.329
In sum, the Hamdan Court's analysis of every 
major issue was
implausible under existing law. This conclusion 
cannot be dismissed
as merely the opinion of disappointed conservative 
Republicans like
Justice Thomas and John Yoo. Rather, 
even David Cole, the most
acidic and prolific academic critic of the War 
on Terrorism and a
staunch supporter of the Court's decision, 
acknowledged that the
majority had disregarded its precedent:
To say that Hamdan faced an uphill battle 
is a gross understate-
ment. The Supreme Court has said in the past 
that foreign nation-
als who are outside U.S. borders, like 
Hanidan, lack any
constitutional protections. Hamdan was a member 
of the enemy
forces when he was captured, and courts are 
especially reluctant to
interfere with the military's treatment of "enemy 
aliens" in wartime.
He filed his suit before trial, and courts generally 
prefer to wait until
a trial is completed before assessing its legality. 
And as recently as
World War II, the Supreme Court upheld the 
use of military tribu-
nals, and ruled that the Geneva Conventions are 
not enforceable by
325 See id. at 2839-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bradley 
& Goldsmith, supra note
23, at 2130 n.366 (providing further support for Justice 
Thomas's argument).
326 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (majority opinion); 
see also Katyal, supra note
9, at 71, 98, 110-12 (contending that the Court correctly 
insisted that military trials
must have the essential elements of military 
justice and comply with the Geneva
Conventions).
327 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 109.
328 See id. at 108-09 (setting forth this chronology). 
Justice Stevens specifically,
and wrongly, asserted that Article 21 had been 
passed after the Court's Eisentrager
decision. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
329 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 107-09 (compiling relevant 
documentation). One
might argue that the UCMJ's "law of war" phrase 
refers to an evolving legal system
and hence encompasses all later changes to 
that law. However, the Court presented
no evidence that the "law of war" contained in 
the Geneva Conventions contemplated
judicial rather than political enforcement or that Congress 
intended, contrary to the
Conventions, to provide a federal court forum. 
See id. at 107-08 (citing sources).
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individuals in U.S. courts but may be enforced only through 
diplo-
matic means.
. . . And as if Hamdan did not face enough 
hurdles, after the
Supreme Court agreed to hear his case, Congress 
passed a law [the
DTA] that appeared to be designed to strip the Supreme 
Court of
its jurisdiction to hear the case.
.... The fact that the Court decided the case 
at all in the face of
Congress' efforts to strip the Court of jurisdiction is remarkable 
in
itself. That the Court then broke away from 
its history of judicial
deference to security claims in wartime to rule 
against the presi-
dent, not even pausing at the argument that 
the decisions of the
commander in chief are "binding on the courts," 
suggests just how
troubled the Court's majority was by the President's assertion 
of uni-
lateral executive power.
33 0
In other words, precedent demanded that 
the Court decline jurisdic-
tion (or at least defer to the President's decision to 
try Hamdan by
military commission), but five Justices were so "troubled" 
that they
ignored this law to whack Bush. The legal consideration 
identified by
the majority as central-lack of congressional authorization-is 
so
unconvincing as to invite an inquiry into 
their real motives. Once
again, the Justices seem to have engaged in 
a discretionary, pragmatic
weighing of three factors.
The first was the severity of the crisis. Justice 
Stevens and his col-
leagues apparently viewed 9/11 as an isolated 
event with no recur-
rence for five years, and hence unlike 
an ongoing and nation-
menacing conflict such as World War 11.331 
These Justices obviously
were aware that the terrorists might in the future 
wage such an all-out
war, but believed that until then the Court 
should insist on ordinary
procedures (like courts-martial). By contrast, dissenting 
Justices like
Thomas characterized terrorism as a pressing, 
continuous, and mortal
threat. Consequently, they found it prudent 
to allow the President to
create a military commission with discretion 
to deny Hamdan access
330 See Cole, supra note 9; see also Pilon, supra 
note 323, at v, xii (noting Cole's
praise of Hamdan, despite its conceded legal weaknesses). 
On this score, Professor
Cole agreed with Bush's chief defender, John 
Yoo, who charged that the Court had
"tossed aside centuries of American history, judicial decisions 
of long standing, and a
December 2005 law ordering them not to interfere with 
the military trials." John Yoo,
Five Wrong Justices: Ruling Mistakes War for Formality of Nation's 
Criminal Justice System,
USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 22A.
331 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 
280-81 (pointing out that the legal
elite approved military tribunals in World War Il-a 
total war mobilizing the entire
nation in a fight for its survival-but not in the War 
on Terrorism, which they see as a
comparatively low-stakes conflict involving few 
changes or sacrifices in daily life).
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to information that he could pass on to al Qaeda operatives, possibly
enabling them to harm and kill Americans.
Second, the members of the Court had radically different per-
spectives on the egregiousness of the legal violation. Formally, the
majority in Hamdan held only that the President lacked legislative per-
mission to establish military tribunals. That statutory interpretation,
however, reflected fundamental concerns of due process -- ensuring
that the structure and procedures of military courts instill confidence
that trials will be fair and impartial. The majority saw the military
commissions as kangaroo courts with the discretion to bar the accused
from the trial, deny his access to relevant information, and admit
unreliable evidence-all subject to the executive branch's power to
alter the procedural rules at any time or to terminate the proceed-
ings. 33 2 The dissenters, on the other hand, perceived no legal prob-
lem with trying alien enemy combatants by military commission rather
than court-martial. Indeed, such a commission struck them as espe-
cially appropriate for Hamdan, a trusted aide of Osama bin Laden. 33
Justice Thomas thought Hamdan was lucky to have been given the
usual criminal procedural rights, except for access to information that
might threaten national security.
Third, the Court did not mention, but surely knew, that President
Bush would obey its judgment. Despite his tough stance in prosecut-
ing the War on Terrorism, he had never so much as hinted that he
would defy a judicial order. Even if Bush were so inclined, he did not
have the political strength to do so. At the time Hamdan came down,
Bush's popularity rating had sunk to historic lows, and he had little
political capital to waste. 334 Moreover, the Court wisely did not put
Bush's back up against a wall by declaring military commissions
unconstitutional. Rather, the majority signaled that such tribunals
would pass muster if Congress explicitly approved them. Returning
the courtesy, President Bush responded that he took the Court's rul-
332 See Katyal, supra note 9, at 74-75, 87-91, 99-105 (arguing that the Court's
statutory construction incorporated constitutional considerations raised by the Presi-
dent's assertion of unilateral and legally unlimited power to establish military commis-
sions, promulgate questionable rules of procedure and evidence, and change such
rules at his whim).
333 It is important to bear in mind that Hamdan is an admitted al Qaeda insider,
not someone languishing in Guantanamo Bay because he had been swept up in an
overzealous post-September 11 raid. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and
Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4,
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-194), 2006 WL 467688 (citing February 9, 2004
Affidavit of Salin Ahmed Hamdan, at 1-2).
334 Bush's approval rating had hit an all-time nadir of thirty-one percent the
month before the Court decided Hamdan. See supra note 280.
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ing "very seriously" and would work with Congress to enact a law on
military commissions that would satisfy the majority's concerns. -5
Bush thereupon did exactly as promised, and Congress swiftly author-
ized such tribunals with very broad powers.336
As with the 2004 detention decisions, then, Hamdan is a setback
for the President, but hardly the devastating blow imagined by many
commentators.3 37 The Court has not plunged into a brave new world
of bold judicial review. Rather, fourJustices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito) embraced strong executive power; two others (Kennedy
and Breyer) concurred to emphasize the limited nature of the Court's
holding; and even Justice Stevens and his allies did not question the
President's authority to detain alien enemy combatants like Hamdan
or to try them outside of the ordinary federal court system. Rather,
the majority seized an opportunity to check a politically vulnerable
President by requiring him to obtain unmistakable authorization from
Congress before using military commissions in a nonemergency situa-
335 See Savage, supra note 9.
336 Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17,
2006). The quick passage of the MCA casts doubt on the Hamdan Court's suggestion
that the President had disregarded Congress's will in establishing military commis-
sions. Indeed, the MCA rejects Hamdan in three important ways. First, the majority's
conclusion that the UCMJ required the executive to demonstrate in litigation the
impracticability of applying court-martial rules has been repudiated in section
949a(a) of the MCA, which grants the Secretary of Defense discretion to employ such
rules "so far as [he] considers practicable or consistent with military or intelligence
activities." Second, Congress disavowed the Court's expansive interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions by declaring that (1) the military commissions were "regularly
constituted courts" that met the requirements of Common Article 3, and (2) alien
unlawful enemy combatants could not invoke the Conventions as a source of legal
rights. See MCA §§ 948b (f)-(g); 28 U.S.C. § 2241, note § 5(a). Third, Congress
disapproved Hamdan and Rasul by eliminating federal court jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions and other actions filed by alien enemy combatants. See MCA
§ 950j(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note § 7(a). Rather, the statute authorizes review exclu-
sively by various military tribunals, followed by appeals to the D.C. Circuit and the
Supreme Court. See MCA § 950b-g. Congress did, however, address one of the
Court's major concerns by guaranteeing the accused's right to be present at all
proceedings as long as he does not engage in disruptive or dangerous conduct. See
MCA §§ 949a(b)(1)(B), 949d(b), (e).
337 SeeYoo, supra note 14, at 109; see also supra notes 9-10 (setting forth the views
of numerous scholars). Unlike in Hamdi, the majority and concurring opinions in
Hamdan did not mention the traditional deference shown to the executive branch's
military judgments. Professor Flaherty interprets this silence as signaling increased
judicial skepticism towards presidential claims of national security. See Flaherty, supra
note 9, at 74-76. Although that trend is possible, I doubt that the Court has suddenly
abandoned its historical posture of deference. Rather, it is flexing its muscles against
President Bush because it can.
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tion where regular procedures could be followed. The Court conspic-
uously avoided grand constitutional pronouncements and focused on
the particular circumstances.
The situation, and hence the Court's approach, could change in
an instant. For example, if the terrorists had succeeded in their July
2006 plot to blow up ten planes bound from England to the United
States, 338 Americans would have clamored for much tighter security
measures and harsh treatment of the perpetrators. In such a climate,
the Justices would become more reluctant to guarantee procedural
niceties to accused terrorists.
Overall, the four "enemy combatant" decisions follow a historical
pattern in which the Court has curbed the President and vindicated
individual rights when politically feasible to do so. Such cases
represent a statistical minority, however, as the Justices usually defer
to the military judgments of the majoritarian branches, often because
they have no other realistic choice. If the terrorists escalate their
attacks and the President responds aggressively, history suggests that
the Court will back down.
IV. DEFENDING THE COURT'S DEFERENTIAL APPROACH
Many scholars have criticized the Court for failing to apply the
same level of review in disputes involving war powers as it does in
domestic cases-i.e., following its independent interpretation of the
Constitution, despite the contrary views of elected officials and possi-
ble negative political consequences.33 9 This argument gives short
shrift to basic elements of the Constitution's design which have always
338 Alan Cowell & Dexter Filkins, Terror Plot Foiled; Airports Quickly Clamp Down,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at Al.
339 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. On the domestic front, the Rehn-
quist Court did not hesitate to strike down federal statutes that, in its judgment,
exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-27 (2000)
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, which had been passed under both of
these powers); see also Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 132-36 (1999) (discussing Morrison).
Similarly, the Court followed its interpretation of the First Amendment in striking
down hugely popular federal and state laws banning flag burning. See United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20
(1989). Finally, the Court even resolved the 2000 presidential election deadlock,
based on a creative reading of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 104-10 (2000); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the
Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and
Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 619-23 (2001) (discussing this issue).
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generated special (and very deferential) standards for reviewing the
exercise of military powers.
As the Founders recognized, war raises issues of utmost national
importance which Congress and the President can and will address,
and they will be held politically accountable for their decisions. 340
Subjecting such delicate policy judgments to exacting scrutiny by
unelected judges with no expertise in military affairs seems inappro-
priate in a constitutional democracy.34t Furthermore, the political
departments, especially the executive, have overwhelming institu-
I do not mean to imply, however, that in domestic cases the Court is heedless of
political consequences. Although such considerations are rarely mentioned in opin-
ions, there are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 868-78 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, despite doubts about its correctness as an original
matter, in part because doing so might create the impression that the Court was yield-
ing to political and social pressure). Another familiar example is the continuing
application of the political question doctrine to certain domestic disputes, such as
impeachment. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-38 (1993).
340 See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
341 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 83-84 (stressing that the Court's traditional defer-
ence to the political branches in military and foreign affairs reflects the constitutional
plan). This proposition seems unassailable as to decisions that affect all Americans
equally, such as declaring war and rationing goods that are vital to the war effort.
However, political checks have proved unreliable when a fearful majority overreacted
to a crisis and supported the political branches' suppression of the constitutional
rights and liberties of vulnerable and powerless minority groups (e.g., Japanese-Amer-
icans during World War II) and unpopular individuals (e.g., left-wing antiwar protes-
tors during World War I and the Cold War). See Cole, Judging, supra note 8, at
2565-71, 2575, 2590-95. In such situations, the only possible forum for relief has
been an independent Article III court charged with the duty to hear complaints that
the government's actions ran afoul of the Constitution. Id. at 2590-95. Even though
federal courts have often performed this job poorly, they have sometimes acted coura-
geously and have often set forth legal principles that constrain the government from
excessive measures in later emergencies. Id. at 2565-68, 2587-95.
The foregoing arguments explain why federal judges have always entertained
claims that military decisions have violated individual rights, albeit under very forgiv-
ing standards and with an awareness of political realities. I believe that such lenient
judicial review is appropriate, and I would not endorse complete judicial abdication
except in very rare and limited circumstances. See infra notes 351-57 and accompany-
ing text.
Professors Posner and Vermeule reject the assertion that fear and panic have
caused government officials to exaggerate military risks and to adopt bad policies that
have unreasonably restricted civil liberties, thereby justifying more searching judicial
review. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 609-11, 626. Rather, they contend that
fear can motivate clear and decisive action that better protects national security while
still preserving individual rights and liberties at an optimal level. Id. at 609-11,
626-42.
[VOL. 82:3
..... At * t A. QRViEW
1080 NOTrRE' DA - -r AW ........
tional advantages in this area.
3 42 Congress's powers to declare war,
fund the armed forces, and oversee executive actions 
are designed to
ensure broad-based support for military 
efforts. 43  The President
alone can respond to emergencies and can implement 
war strategy
with the requisite swiftness, decisiveness, and 
access to information
(which is often secret) .544 By contrast, the judiciary inherently 
pro-
ceeds far more slowly and deliberatively than 
either Congress or the
President. Indeed, courts can do nothing until 
a party files suit. Even
then, judges must conduct time-consuming trials that (absent 
a settle-
ment) culminate in a reasoned judgment that applies the 
law to the
pertinent facts, followed by appeals that consider 
the legal issues still
further.345 Therefore, several years typically 
elapse between the exec-
utive's action and the Supreme Court's decision. 
This passage of time
often enables the Justices to evaluate constitutional 
law issues far more
dispassionately than would have been possible 
in the heat of the mili-
tary crisis.3 46 Even then, however, courts can 
fairly judge the Presi-
dent only based upon the facts as he understood 
them at the moment
of decision, not with the benefit 
of hindsight.347
Finally, the judicial time lag is sometimes insufficient because 
a
nation-threatening war drags on, the President 
has charted an irrevo-
cable course, and he will defy any order requiring 
him to comply with
the Court's legal views.
3 48 In such critical situations, rendering ajudg-
ment seems pointless, for its only effect will 
be to compromise the
342 See Nzelibe, supra note 64, at 975-99.
343 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying 
text.
344 See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying 
text; see also Cole, Judging, supra note
8, at 2570 (recognizing that judges feel ill-equipped to assess 
the executive branch's
claims of national security because it has a monopoly 
on the relevant information).
345 For discussion of the essential attributes 
of judicial power, see Pusbaw,
Justiciability, supra note 38, at 415-27; Pushaw, 
Inherent, supra note 38, at 746, 789,
805-06, 809, 827, 844-46; see also Yoo, supra 
note 242, at 590-600 (maintaining that
federal courts are institutionally in a poor position 
to make judgments about national
security because of their slow processes, their 
focus on specific facts and issues rather
than general policies, and their lack of expertise 
in military and foreign affairs).
346 The Court sometimes acknowledges this 
reality. See supra note 122 and accom-
panying text; see also Cole, judging, supra note 8, at 
2566, 2575-76 (providing
examples).
347 See Tushnet, supra note 185, at 282-92, 
300, 307 (arguing that political offi-
cials, especially the President, must make decisions 
when the war's outcome is uncer-
tain and information is often incomplete or 
inaccurate (sometimes because of a
subordinate official's mistakes or biases), whereas later 
critics of such decisions,
including courts, have the advantage of hindsight); Maltz, 
supra note 12, at 863-70
(to similar effect).
348 See supra Part I1.B.1, II.C (discussing the interaction 
between the President and
the Court during the Civil War and World War 
II).
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Court's legitimacy. For instance, Chief Justice Taney's unheeded
order to Lincoln to release a military prisoner ended up highlighting
the Court's own impotence. 349 It is worth remembering that today we
revere Lincoln and revile Taney. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
showed real courage in confronting Lincoln throughout the Civil
War, as did Justice Jackson in standing up to his patron Franklin
Roosevelt during World War II in Korematsu. Such genuine acts of
judicial valor should not be cheapened by comparing them with the
Court's exploitation of politically weak and unpopular Presidents like
Andrew Johnson, Harry Truman, and George W. Bush.
In short, the Court has generally, and appropriately, recognized
that separation of powers dictates great respect for the military deci-
sions of Congress and the President. Moreover, the Justices have inev-
itably decided cases based not simply upon abstract rules of law, but
also upon various political and practical considerations. Operating
within these constitutional and pragmatic confines, the Court has
tried to articulate and enforce individual rights and liberties to the
extent possible, as it did recently in the "enemy combatant" litigation.
On the whole, I think the Court has performed about as well as can be
expected, even though I disagree with many of its rulings.3 50
The only cases where I would change the approach (albeit not
the result) are those in which a politically powerful President, such as
Lincoln or Roosevelt, has made a decision to violate a particular con-
stitutional provision because he concludes that such a drastic measure
is necessary to win a war that imperils America's very existence, and
therefore will likely disobey any judicial order to halt the policy. In
such unique circumstances, the Court should not uphold the Presi-
dent's actions on the merits. Rather, it should avoid decision alto-
gether by denying certiorari,3 51 declaring the question presented to
349 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text; see also Cole, Judging, supra note
8, at 2570-71 (acknowledging that such defiance, when the President has concluded
that national security is at stake, weakens the Court's credibility).
350 For example, I believe that Rasul and Hamdan rest on incorrect statutory inter-
pretations that disregard precedent squarely on point, and that these cases might
impede our efforts to combat worldwide terrorism. So far, however, they have not
had any catastrophic effects. See Katyal, supra note 9, at 104 (observing that the Bush
Administration's dire warnings that adverse decisions in Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan
would threaten national security have not materialized).
351 Since 1988, the Court has had complete discretion in deciding whether or not
to grant such a writ. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000). Hence, denying review raises no
legal problems.
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be "political," 35 2 or delaying judgment through resort to doctrines
such as ripeness.3 5
3
Admittedly, the selective invocation of judicial restraint concepts
can be decried as unprincipled, even cowardly.3 54 Nonetheless, what
actually happened in cases like Korematsu was even more legally and
morally indefensible: sustaining blatantly unconstitutional conduct,
which gave the President the invaluable stamp of approval by the
Supreme Court, our most respected and prestigious government insti-
tution.3 5 5 Instead, the Justices should have forced Congress and the
President to accept total responsibility for their actions, to be judged
by voters and posterity.3 56
352 See Pushaw, supra note 43 (examining the political question doctrine). I would
confine my proposal to this unusual situation. Other scholars have contended more
broadly that courts should frankly recognize that executive officials will exercise extra-
constitutional powers during emergencies and should leave judgment on such actions
to the political process, instead of rationalizing such measures as constitutionally valid
and thereby contaminating constitutional law. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules:
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1121-26
(2003); Tushnet, supra note 185, at 298-307.
353 See MAY, supra note 37, at 272-73 (deeming ripeness especially useful because
it allows a court to consider its capacity to adjudicate a case properly in light of the
nature of the emergency, its relationship to the challenged measure, the state of the
factual record, and the type of relief sought).
354 The classic defense of such jurisdictional manipulation, for the purpose of
ensuring that constitutional decisions on the merits are always principled, is ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d. ed. 1986) (1962). 1 do not
believe, however, that Bickel's approach should be applied outside the context of an
implacable President engaged in a cataclysmic war. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra
note 38, at 465-67 (criticizing Bickel's argument).
355 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing); Tushnet, supra note 185, at 301 (citing CHtARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT 47-86 (1960)) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court legitimizes govern-
ment actions taken in an emergency by upholding their constitutionality); see also
MAY, supra note 37, at 260-68 (arguing that the political question doctrine amounts
to an abdication of duty, but is still preferable to the Korematsu approach of approving
a measure that risks permanent damage to the Constitution).
356 Some scholars have countered that principled judicial review is necessary to
facilitate meaningful congressional involvement, See, e.g., ELY, supra note 11, at
47-67. Concededly, many constitutional provisions require Congress to take affirma-
tive steps to authorize executive action during wartime. Most pertinent here is the
prohibition on suspending habeas corpus absent express congressional approval in
times of invasion or rebellion. This clause indicates that the President cannot detain
citizens during wartime without such legislation (or a criminal indictment). See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), discussed
supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. But see Tushnet, supra note 185, at
301-03 (contending that it is futile to expect a Constitution's designers to be able to
formulate a provision, such as the Nonsuspension Clause, that will always constrain
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With this single exception, I believe the Court's approach is
defensible on both constitutional and pragmatic grounds. Indeed, it
is wishful thinking to expect that the Court can, or will, apply robust
judicial review to political branch actions during wartime.
V. CONCLUSION
Our Founding Fathers wisely committed the formulation and
execution of military policy to Congress and the President. When
political decisions about war allegedly invade individual constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court has either declined to intervene or has
applied a deferential standard of review whereby the government's
actions are usually (but not always) upheld. Admittedly, war powers
jurisprudence is not a model of legal consistency. Nor can it be, for
the Court has properly paid close attention to the facts and context of
each case -and to its own institutional and political limits during
wartime.
Accordingly, it would be a mistake to interpret the recent cases
upholding the rights of enemy combatants as portending a more gen-
eral shift towards greater protection of individual liberty in the mili-
tary context. History has taught us that such decisions are the
exception, not the rule. During wartime, judicial discretion is usually
the better part of valor.
future exercises of power in response to emergencies that they could never have fore-
seen, such as the attack on the World Trade Center); Ackerman, supra note 185, at
1038, 1053, 1084-87 (to similar effect). Likewise, Article I restricts any appropriations
for military support to a two-year maximum and allows Congress to decline to provide
such funding or to halt a prior appropriation. See supra notes 48-49, 61 and accompa-
nying text. Historically, judicial nonenforcement of such constitutional provisions
has resulted in the President asserting discretion to act and Congress doing nothing
to stop him, thereby effectuating a vast accumulation of power in the executive.
The short response is that the Constitution allocates war powers to the political
branches, not the judiciary. See Yoo, Continuation, supra note 12, at 299-300. Con-
gress's failure to exercise its ample Article I powers to check the President (e.g., by
denying military funding) does not somehow authorize federal courts to step in to
encourage Congress to act. Id.
Although federal judges cannot referee disputes between Congress and the Presi-
dent over war powers, they can enforce constitutional provisions (e.g., the Nonsus-
pension Clause) at the behest of an individual who alleges unlawful federal
government conduct that affects her. Whether such review proves successful depends
primarily on the circumstances of the case.
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